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ABSTRACT 
Modeling Single Family Housing Recovery after Hurricane Andrew in Miami-Dade 
County, FL. (August 2006) 
Yang Zhang, 
B.S., Beijing University, China; 
M.S., Beijing University, China 
Co-Chairs of Advisory Committee:     Dr. Walter G. Peacock 
Dr. Michael K. Lindell 
This research seeks to improve the current state of knowledge about housing 
recovery following a major natural disaster through examining single family housing 
recovery following Hurricane Andrew, a category 5 hurricane, which impacted southern 
sections of Miami-Dade County in 1992. This inquiry focused on two questions: (1) 
what is the recovery process for single family housing in a disaster impact area, and (2) 
how does the housing recovery process vary across households and neighborhoods? To 
answer these questions, the 1992-96 tax appraisal values for Miami-Dade County were 
used to measure housing damage and recovery after the storm. Hierarchical Linear 
Modeling (HLM) was used to quantitatively model this recovery process and identify the 
major factors in play.  
With regard to the first question, our findings suggested that Hurricane Andrew 
caused extensive housing damage in the impact area, rendering an average loss to 
households of 50.4% of pre-disaster home value. Two years after the storm (1994), the 
average home value returned to its pre-disaster level. In the subsequent two years (1995-
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96), the average home value continued growing, representing a 7.6% and 14.9% gain, 
respectively, over the pre-disaster average.  
Regarding the second question, our analysis found that the housing recovery 
process varied significantly across households and neighborhoods. Owner-occupied 
homes recovered more rapidly than rental units. Household income had a positive effect 
on housing recovery. Our analysis also suggested that post-disaster home sales had a 
significant negative effect on housing recovery. Neighborhood race/ethnicity 
composition affected the housing recovery process. Homes in minority populated 
neighborhoods (both Hispanic and non-Hispanic Black) recovered more slowly than 
homes in majority populated areas (non-Hispanic White). When considering Cuban-
Hispanics and non-Cuban Hispanics as two separate groups, neighborhoods with a 
higher concentration of Cuban-Hispanics, while having no clear advantage at the 
beginning of the recovery period, recovered more rapidly than other minority populated 
areas. 
Previous studies suggested that the long-term impact of natural disasters at the 
aggregated level is minimal, and yet our results showed that the housing impact of 
Hurricane Andrew lasted at least more than four years. In fact, housing inequality in the 
impact area increased markedly during the recovery process due to the unequal nature of 
housing recovery. 
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM OF HOUSING RECOVERY1 
2005 was one of the deadliest years in American disaster history as four major 
hurricanes (Dennis, Wilma, Katrina and Rita) devastated the United States Coast area. 
Hurricane Katrina’s massive destruction in states of Louisiana and Mississippi made it 
the most costly natural disaster in the United States. A preliminary assessment of 
damaged housing stock estimated that about 302,000 units were damaged in the 
impacted areas (Table 1.1), which surpassed all previous major natural disasters. For 
weeks, the dramatic views of displaced victims and flattened neighborhoods were etched 
in the minds of Americans. However, the news coverage tailed off quickly as the 
immediate shock passed, and the recovery processes was just about to begin. Thus, in 
contrast to the immediate emergency response, Americans were left with no clear image 
of the recovery process following a major disaster. 
Disaster recovery is a multidimensional phenomenon. For households, recovery 
involves recovering from psychological stress caused by the event as well as the process 
of regaining income, employment, household amenities, and household assets (Bates, 
1982; Bolin, 1976, 1982, 1993; Bolin and Bolton, 1983; Peacock et al., 1987). For the 
impacted community, recovery involves restoring community businesses, population 
base, and government functions (Friesma et al., 1979; Haas et al., 1977; Lindell et al., 
2006; Wright et al., 1979). Nevertheless, housing is perhaps the key element in 
understanding disaster recovery at both the household and community levels as it is the 
                                                 
1This dissertation follows the style of Journal of American Planning Association. 
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victims’ most fundamental need to resume their normal activities (Bolin, 1991; 
Quarantelli, 1982). Timely reconstruction of damaged housing after a disaster is a 
common goal shared by residents, property owners, local businesses, and local 
government. Housing recovery is often a daunting task following a major natural disaster 
(Table 1.1) as a massive amount of damaged property needs to be repaired. The recovery 
process is often a time with immense potential for competition and conflict as impacted 
households, property owners, businesses, and local governments compete for resources 
to engage in the reconstruction process (Bates & Peacock, 1992; Schwab et al., 1998; 
Smith & Deyle, 1998). While there may be a relatively high degree of cooperation in the 
immediate aftermath of a major natural disaster, sometimes referred to as a therapeutic 
community, the recovery period can best be characterized as a contested terrain where a 
multitude of actors often compete for scarce resources in their efforts to return to some 
sense of normalcy. Researchers have begun to more fully explore disaster impact and 
various aspects of household recovery. Not surprisingly, they found that normal social 
processes and dynamics often find full play in the aftermath of a disaster. For example, 
minority populations and marginalized groups are often the hardest hit, and yet they tend 
to be excluded from the post-disaster decision making processes and have limited access 
to recovery resources (Bolin & Stanford, 1998; Peacock et al., 1997). While these 
findings have clear implications for housing recovery, little empirical research has 
focused on housing recovery processes themselves. 
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Table 1.1. Housing Damages of Major Disasters 
 
 
Hurricane 
Hugo 
Loma Prieta 
Earthquake 
Hurricane 
Andrew 
Northridge 
Earthquake 
Hurricane 
Katrina 
Time Sept. 1989 Oct. 1989 Aug. 1992 Jan. 1994 Aug. 2005 
Physical Severity1 Category 4 Magnitude 7.1 Category 5 Magnitude 6.8  Category 4 
Impact area SC, NC CA FL, LA CA LA, MS, AL 
Single Family 79, 627*** 19,600*** 86,250*** 13,000*** NA2**** 
Multi-family 11,908*** 23,500*** 38,603*** 49,000*** NA**** 
Total 91,435*** 43,100*** 124,853*** 60,000*** 302,000**** 
Uninhabitable 32%*** 25%*** 59%*** 13%*** NA**** 
1: Hurricanes are measured on the Saffir – Simpson Scale when they make landfall; earthquakes are 
measured by Richter scale. 
2: Not Available. 
Source: National Low Income Housing Coalition 2005; Comerio 1998  
 
This research seeks to improve the current state of knowledge about recovery 
processes through examining single family housing recovery following hurricane 
Andrew, a category 5 hurricane, that struck southern sections of Miami-Dade County in 
1992, damaging over 124,000 homes in the area and leaving 74,000 uninhabitable. 
Specifically, the following two general research questions are the focus of this research. 
(1) What is the recovery process for single family housing in the disaster impact area? (2) 
How does housing recovery process vary across different households and neighborhoods?   
This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter II is the literature review that 
summarizes previous research on the housing recovery in the United States, recovery 
modeling and major determinants. This review concludes with a statement of seven 
research hypothesis. Chapter III is essentially methodological, discussing the general 
principles to be followed for compiling datasets and designing analytical models to 
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assess housing recovery. It also discusses analytical approaches for addressing different 
levels of analysis – household and neighborhood. Chapter IV explains measurement, 
data source for independent and dependent variables. Chapter V describes the major 
analyses and hypothesis tests. Chapter VI summarizes the major research findings and 
also discusses research limitation, theoretical and policy implications.  
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CHAPTER II  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Housing recovery following a major natural disaster is essentially a market-driven 
process in the United States. With the exception of the 1964 Alaska Earthquake when 
the federal government was actively involved in housing reconstruction, government 
does not traditionally play a major role in the housing recovery process (Kates, 1970; 
Quarantelli & Dynes, 1989). During the emergency response and early disaster recovery, 
the government, along with non-governmental organizations such as the Red Cross and 
some faith-based organizations, play important roles in temporarily accommodating 
displaced victims. In most cases, they provide temporary shelter and/or temporary 
housing in the form of tents, and during extreme situations, mobile homes and trailers 
(Bolin, 1993; Comerio, 1998; Lindell & Prater, 2003; Peacock & Ragsdale, 1997). On 
the whole, housing recovery generally depends upon the market. In the long term, 
individuals and property owners must obtain the necessary resources either to repair or 
rebuild. Similarly, renters bear the responsibilities for relocating themselves to other 
housing. For those seeking to rebuild, property insurance and private savings are their 
major financial resources for funding housing recovery. Government programs such as 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) minimal home repair (MHR) 
and individual family grant (IFG), and the Small Business Administration’s (SBA) low-
interest loans, along with contributions from non-profit organizations supplement these 
private sources. After Hurricane Andrew, for example, private insurance funded almost 
95% of housing repair and reconstruction, while funding from government programs and 
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other sources accounted for less than 5% (Peacock et al., forthcoming). Of course, this 
does not mean that governmental financial resources have a negligible impact on the 
repair and/or reconstruction of all homes. Indeed, these funds may represent the only 
funding available for some households. However, for housing recovery as a whole, it is 
the private market that generally funds most housing reconstruction.  
The market-based approach has resulted in a neglect of housing recovery in local 
communities’ recovery policies (Bolin, 1985, 1994; Mileti, 1999; Peacock & Girard, 
1997; Quarantelli, 1982; Wu & Lindell, 2004). As a number of researchers have 
suggested, market-based recovery is conservative in nature because the restoration of the 
status quo ante is often times the major goal in this process (Bates & Peacock, 1989; 
Bolin 1982, 1985). Other researchers have gone a step further by suggesting that market-
based disaster recovery may in fact accentuate pre-disaster social inequality (Bolin, 1982, 
1985; Bolin & Stanford, 1991, 1998; Hass et al., 1977; Peacock & Ragsdale, 1997). Pre-
disaster social patterns in the housing market are believed to have a major influence in 
determining permanent housing recovery (Bates, 1982; Bates & Peacock, 1987; Blaike 
et al., 1994; Quarantelli, 1982). In this regard, it is worthwhile to review the social 
patterns embedded in the American housing market.     
Housing Markets in the United States 
Housing markets in the United States systematically fail to provide quality housing 
for low-income households and this failure disproportionately affects racial and ethnic 
minorities (Alba & Logan, 1992; Bratt et al., 1986; Horton, 1992; Lake, 1980). Low-
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income and racial/ethnic households tend to reside in poorer quality, less well 
maintained housing. Minorities, especially Blacks, still find major problems with racial 
discrimination when buying, selling, and renting housing because of racial steering, 
redlining, and hostile white attitudes. (Feagin & Sikes, 1994; Guy et al., 1982; Horton, 
1992; Oliver & Shapiro, 1995; Sagalyn, 1983). Moreover, minorities, particularly Blacks, 
are more likely to be denied a mortgage. Even if they do obtain mortgages, they often 
have to make larger down payments and pay higher interest rates (Oliver & Shapiro, 
1995). One of the major factors in successfully obtaining a mortgage is finding 
homeowner insurance, which is often a significant impediment for minorities. Thus, it is 
impossible for them to procure a home mortgage (Squires, 1998; Squires et al., 2001; 
Squires & Velez, 1987).  
Residential segregation still remains at a very high level in the United States with 
low-income and minority households, especially Blacks, often clustering in low-valued 
neighborhoods (Logan & Molotch, 1987; Stinchcombe, 1965; South & Crowder, 1997). 
In addition, households in these areas are substantially less likely than Whites to escape 
poor neighborhoods (Iceland et al., 2002; Logan & Molotch, 1987; Massey & Denton, 
1993; South & Crowder, 1997). This perpetual residential segregation has significant 
consequences for housing attainment. Predominantly minority neighborhoods often have 
undesirable conditions such as high crime rates, high poverty levels, low school quality, 
etc. (Harris, 1999; Jargowsky, 1997; Taub et al., 1984; Wilson, 1996). Consequently, 
homes in such areas are in lower demand and more likely to appreciate at low rates 
(Flippen, 2004).               
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Housing Recovery in the United States 
In the context of market-based housing recovery, determinants of normal housing 
attainment such as income, race/ethnicity, class, and household composition are 
expected to take on added significance. Low income and minority households face many 
challenges when recovering from disasters. Because such households often live in 
structures that were built according to older, less stringent building codes, used lower 
quality designs and construction materials, and were less well maintained (Bolin, 1994; 
Bolin & Bolton, 1983; Bolin & Stanford, 1998; Peacock & Girard, 1997), they tend to 
suffer disproportionately higher levels of damage in natural disasters. In turn, the high 
level of damage can be anticipated to slow the recovery process unless supplemented 
with higher levels of resources. Yet, this population often lacks access to quality 
property insurance (Bolin & Stanford, 1998; Comerio, 1998; Peacock & Girard, 1997). 
In addition, low-income households are less likely to qualify for governmental/private 
reconstruction programs because of their limited capability to repay (Bolin, 1986; Bolin 
& Bolton, 1983; Tierney, 1997). Peacock and Girard (1997), for example, found that 
minority homeowners in Miami-Dade County were less likely to be covered by one of 
the top three insurance companies and hence were much more likely to report having 
insufficient insurance payments to initiate the reconstruction process. Households not 
covered by one of the top insurance companies were many times more likely to report 
insufficient insurance payments. Indeed, one of the most important correlates of 
insurance coverage was the proportion of minorities living in one block. In other words, 
there was a clear indication of insurance red-lining prior to Hurricane Andrew that 
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resulted in lower insurance settlements in minority Hispanic and Black areas. Moreover, 
poor language skills and limited education can leave many minorities and low income 
households at a distinct disadvantage in the protracted negotiations necessary for 
housing reconstruction. Low income households often have limited transportation 
options which may even decrease following a disaster when public transportation is 
extensively disrupted. Lack of mobility may slow recovery efforts for these victims and 
even jeopardize their employment (Morrow, 1997; Peacock & Girard, 1997).  
As discussed previously, low income households and minorities are often 
segregated into poor neighborhoods (Massey & Denton, 1993). With less economic 
power and political representation, these marginalized groups are often excluded from 
community disaster planning, hazard mitigation, and recovery activities (Blaike et al., 
1994; Bolin & Bolton, 1983; Morrow, 1998; Phillips, 1993; Tierney, 1989). 
Neighborhoods that were poorer prior to disaster often fall far short of receiving the 
necessary aid to jump start the recovery process, particularly for housing (Berke et al., 
1993; Bolin & Stanford, 1991, 1997; Comerio, 1998; Dash et al., 1997; Kamel & 
Loukaitou-Sideris, 2004; Phillips, 1993; Rubin, 1985). Kamel and Loukaitou-Sideris 
(2004), for example, found that low income neighborhoods and neighborhoods with high 
minority concentrations had limited resources for disaster recovery. In addition, these 
areas were further hindered by lower levels of governmental assistance relative to other 
neighborhoods that sustained similar damages following the Northridge Earthquake.   
Instead of treating minorities as a single group, some disaster research began to 
look into the variations across different minority types, especially Blacks and Hispanics. 
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When studying home insurance coverage and payouts across homeowners in Miami-
Dade County following Hurricane Andrew, Peacock and Girard (1997) found that 
minority households in general, both Blacks and Hispanics, were less likely to have 
home insurance than Anglos. Even when they had home insurance, they were less likely 
to receive sufficient payments to cover home repair/reconstruction costs. However, when 
dividing Hispanics into Cuban Hispanics and non-Cuban Hispanics, their findings 
suggested that there was no difference between Cubans and Whites with regard to 
having home insurance and receiving sufficient settlements. On the other hand, Blacks 
and non-Cuban Hispanics had significantly less accessibility to home insurance and 
insurance settlements compared to Whites.  
Peacock and Girard’s (1997) finding is consistent with the emergence of Cubans in 
Miami-Dade County, which is characterized by a powerful Cuban ethnic enclave in this 
area. The establishment of an enclave economy has allowed Cubans to move quickly 
into the political and economic hierarchy of the region and the nation (Perez, 1992; 
Portes & Bach, 1985; Portes & Stepick, 1993; Wilson & Portes, 1980). As a 
consequence, Cubans generally enjoy greater access to resources than do other 
“minority” groups (Grenier & Morrow, 1997; Geriner & Stepick, 1992;). Blacks, on the 
other hand, still struggle for economic and political status and hence have attenuated 
access to resources (Grenier & Morrow, 1997). In South Miami Dade County, 
particularly around Homestead and Florida City, a pattern similar to non-Hispanic 
Blacks holds for non-Cuban Hispanics who are more likely to be from Mexico.  
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Rental properties have unique recovery problems. Renters have little control over 
the homes in which they live and, as a consequence, have much fewer options for hazard 
adjustments than do homeowners (Burby et al., 2003; Morrow, 1998). The owners of 
rental properties are responsible for recovery functions such as inspecting buildings and 
repairing damages to ensure safe occupancy. Rental properties often take significantly 
longer to rebuild. In their research after the Whittier Narrows, Loma Prieta and 
Northridge earthquakes, Bolin (1986), Bolin (1993), and Comerio et al. (1994) found 
evidence that some landlords delay repairs to damaged housing because of limited 
financial assets. The typically slower reconstruction of rental properties places 
neighborhoods with a high proportion of these properties at risk of failing to recover and 
potentially becoming blighted areas. 
While previous research shows that individual households differ considerably in 
their ability to marshal reconstruction financing, few studies have explored the 
implications of this finding on housing recovery. Indeed, housing impact and recovery 
have only been addressed with highly aggregated data such as community level data. In 
this research, housing recovery was usually characterized as generally being completed 
within two to three years after the event (Comerio, 1998; Wu & Lindell, 2004). When 
assessing the long term consequences of disaster, research concluded that disasters have 
no significant long-term impact on housing development in the impacted community, 
particularly when examining broader countywide or regional impacts (Friesma et al., 
1979; Wright et al., 1979). However, this research was unable to show whether there 
were short-term housing disruptions, even though they are naturally expected based on 
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previous research. Moreover, if short-term housing disruptions do exist, no research has 
documented the point at which such disruptions disappear. In addition, there has been no 
attempt to determine the extent to which the aggregate findings apply to the lower level 
of aggregation such as household and neighborhood levels. One might well expect that 
there are distributive effects at the household/neighborhood level that cannot be detected 
at higher levels of aggregation such as community and county.   
Although housing recovery is rarely addressed in local community policies in the 
United States (Bolin, 1985, 1994; Mileti, 1999; Peacock & Girard, 1997; Quarantelli, 
1982), it is believed that pre-impact recovery planning could facilitate disaster recovery 
(Berke et al., 1993; Rubin, 1991; Schwab et al., 1998) and housing reconstruction in 
particular (Spangle Associates, 1997; Wu & Lindell, 2004). Pre-existing relationships 
among government agencies and local organizations within a community and the 
integration of local government and state/federal agencies can enable the impacted 
community to effectively marshal external financial resources and address recovery 
needs (Berke et al., 1993). Recovery planning may also enable local government to 
anticipate potential confusion and conflict among different agencies during the recovery 
process. This ensures that local government has ability to act and also knows what to do 
when disasters strike (Rubin, 1991). In addition, pre-disaster planning can accelerate 
housing recovery by streamlining administrative processes regarding housing 
reconstruction. Schwab et al. (1998), for example, suggested that local government can 
plan how to accomplish a set of important tasks such as damage assessment, debris 
removal, infrastructure restoration, temporary repair permits, development moratoria and 
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permit processing in order to get housing reconstruction started shortly following the 
disaster. Comerio et al. (1994) and Comerio (1998) found that the confusion and 
duplication of the application requirements for FEMA’s reconstruction grants and SBA’s 
low-interest loans caused considerable time delays for homeowners following the Loma 
Prieta Earthquake. For instance, the application could only be accepted if the victims had 
proof of rejection from other programs. As a result, the victims had to have their 
damaged homes inspected many times by different agencies before they could finally get 
into the line for grants or loans. The authors suggested that local government can work 
with insurance companies and state/federal agencies to expedite processing of insurance 
claims and delivery of governmental reconstruction funds.       
Post-disaster Home Sales  
No research has been done to examine the effect of post-disaster home sales on 
housing recovery. Anecdotal evidence suggests that housing sales became very active in 
the impact area following Hurricane Katrina. There are two plausible reasons that 
explain the unprecedented number of home sales in the impacted community following a 
major disaster. In the post disaster situation, sales may reflect abandonment as owners 
give up on a property, take their insurance money and move to another area. Indeed, a 
natural disaster may reinforce the pre-disaster demographic trend as some victims 
relocate to other places that they may have been contemplating before the disaster. One 
demographer has speculated that Anglo households would use Hurricane Andrew as an 
opportunity to move out of Hispanic areas and into Anglo communities in counties north 
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of Miami-Dade (Girard & Peacock, 1997). In addition, home sales may also result from 
the lack of financial resources to repair or reconstruct the damaged homes. If a property 
sells after an event, it is likely to have been bought by speculators hoping to pick up 
properties at extremely low prices and either sell or repair them for later sales. 
Regardless of the reasons, the effect of home sales on the recovery process is remaining 
unknown.  
Modeling Housing Recovery Process  
Efforts to conceptualize the disaster recovery process can be dated back to Haas et 
al.’s (1977) case study of four cities in the United States and Latin America. Based on 
their study, Haas and his colleagues proposed a four-stage linear model of the 
community recovery process: the emergency period, the restoration period, the 
replacement reconstruction period, and the betterment period, with each period lasting 
approximately 10 times the previous period. Immediately after a disaster, a recovering 
community must undertake emergency responses, such as debris removal, search and 
rescue, and provision of shelters and temporary housing. At the following stage, the 
activities will be restoring public facilities and services. At the third stage, the affected 
community replaces or reconstructs capital stock to its pre-disaster level. Finally, the 
community initiates betterment and developmental reconstruction for further growth. 
Although Haas and his colleagues noted the possibility of considerable overlap among 
the four different phases, their recovery model is criticized for its inaccurate assumption 
of the homogeneous and linear nature of the recovery process (Berke & Beatley, 1992; 
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Berke et al., 1993; Quanrantelli, 1989). In fact, these four recovery stages can take place 
out of order or simultaneously within the same community because of different levels of 
institutional readiness and socio-economic characteristics of the impact area (Bates, 
1982; Berke et al., 1993; Peacock & Bates, 1982; Rubin, 1985).   
Quarantelli’s (1982) case study of sheltering and housing after natural disasters in 
three communities led him to conceptualize housing recovery as four distinct stages of 
post-event sheltering and housing: emergency shelter, temporary shelter, temporary 
housing, and permanent housing. Emergency sheltering is the victims’ immediate 
response to disaster impact based on chance availability, convenience, proximity, and 
perceived safety. Temporary shelters are places where victims can stay for a longer time 
before they can safely return to their own houses. These are often sought in the homes of 
friends and relatives, but mass public facilities (i.e. schools, stadiums) are used as well. 
The next stage is temporary housing in which victims reestablish their routine activities, 
but not in a permanent location. The demand for temporary housing after a disaster is 
usually met by filling vacancies in local housing stock, but the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) and Non Governmental organizations (NGOs) cope with 
excess demand by providing mobile homes. Permanent housing is the final stage of 
housing recovery during which victims either return to their rebuilt homes or relocate to 
new dwellings. This typology of distinctive forms of sheltering and housing has 
problems similar to Haas et al.’s model, particularly if these four stages are viewed as 
phases in which households are expected to progress. There can be many repetitive steps 
and jumps in the recovery process. Furthermore, the distinctions are not always clear as 
  
16 
when temporary housing becomes permanent or when emergency shelter transitions into 
temporary shelter. In addition, in any one disaster, households may be at each of the 
stages simultaneously as some households, for example, move back to permanent 
housing while others still stay in temporary housing.  
In fact, the path to permanent housing consists of a set of overlapped tasks that 
have to be fulfilled in order to move forward in the recovery process (Figure 2.1). Here, 
Quanrantelli’s typology is expanded by the explicit consideration of typical household 
activities that are directly related to each phase of the reconstruction process. A 
household’s ability to accomplish these tasks determines its pace of recovery toward 
permanent housing.  In the immediate aftermath of a severe disaster (emergency 
sheltering and temporary sheltering), the affected households focus on saving lives and 
meeting basic life needs (i.e. sleep, food, water).  As soon as the disaster diminishes, 
they begin to take steps toward returning home. Although individual households will be 
differently affected by the disaster, building inspection/damage assessment needs to be 
undertaken and then further decisions can be made to determine if the home is safe for 
immediate return, slight repair is required, or extensive reconstruction is necessary for 
occupancy.  It is also possible that some victims may decide to relocate to other areas 
during this period.  
If prolonged repair or reconstruction is needed, the victims then turn their attention 
to temporary housing arrangements in anticipation of the closure of the temporary 
shelter. Government and non-government agencies may have temporary housing 
programs (i.e. FEMA’s temporary housing grants, rental reimbursement programs, or 
  
17 
trailer homes) available for victims. Also, affected households can choose to stay with 
relatives or friends or in hotels. Other concurrent activities of households during this 
period include preparing for reconstruction. For reconstruction financing, households 
need to work with insurance companies to sort through insurance claims, inspection and 
final settlements. They may also take steps to apply for reconstruction grants or loans 
funded by governmental / non-governmental agencies (i.e. FEMA Minimum Home 
Repair (MHR) Grant, FEMA Individual Family Grant Program (IFGP) and SBA home 
owner loans). To the extent necessary, households may also need to use private savings, 
refinancing etc. for home reconstruction. In the meantime, homeowners need to find a 
contractor and also get a building permit approved by the county planning department 
for home repairs and reconstruction.  
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Figure 2.1. Illustration of Household Activities in the Housing Recovery Process 
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Impacted households may choose to relocate at each point in the process of moving 
toward permanent housing. Residential relocation following a disaster can either be a 
voluntary movement or a forced decision by the affected households. The voluntary 
relocation explains the theory that disasters often accelerate pre-impact demographic 
trends (Bates et al., 1963; Haas et al., 1977). The households that planned to move long 
before the impact have a good chance to relocate following the disaster. Forced 
relocation reflects the situation where some affected households cannot afford home 
repair and reconstruction or new rental units in the impacted area and are forced to 
relocate (Bolin & Stanford, 1998). For households that decide to move, the relocation 
process involves such activities as filing insurance claims for damaged property, home 
sale, and finding an alternative home.  
While Haas et al.’s model (1977) and Quarantelli’s typology (1982) are useful for 
understanding the recovery process leading to permanent housing, they focus on the 
commonalities of disaster recovery process rather than the differences across households. 
Based on previous studies, a causal model that focuses on variations in the housing 
recovery process can be constructed (Figure 2.2). This model illustrates the factors and 
relationships that affect the outcome of housing recovery. Among all the elements shown 
in the model, pre-disaster household and neighborhood characteristics are the key factors. 
These household characteristics (i.e., household income, race/ethnicity, and ownership) 
and neighborhood characteristics (i.e., race/ethnicity composition and overall income 
level) affect structural vulnerability, social vulnerability and the level and length of 
housing recovery. Here, structural vulnerability refers to the susceptibility of a building 
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to natural disasters. The causal relationship between household/neighborhood 
characteristics and structural vulnerability is expected given the research findings that 
suggest that class and race/ethnicity are strong correlates of structural characteristics. 
Low income and minority households are more likely to live in structures that are old, 
built according to less stringent building codes with low quality design and construction 
materials, and are poorly maintained (Bolin, 1994; Bolin & Bolton, 1983; Bolin & 
Stanford, 1998; Peacock & Girard, 1997). Because of residential segregation, homes in 
poor and predominantly minority, especially Blacks, neighborhoods are in low demand 
and become similarly deteriorated in the long run (Flippen, 2004; Harris, 1999; 
Jargowsky, 1997; Taub et al., 1984; Wilson, 1996).  
Social vulnerability refers to the differential capacity individuals and groups have 
to cope with natural disasters (Blakie et al., 1994, Cutter et al., 2003). Just as structural 
vulnerability is not randomly distributed, social vulnerability is not randomly distributed 
either. Rather, social vulnerability hinges upon those social factors that shape the 
susceptibility of individuals and/or groups to disasters and their ability to anticipate, 
cope with, and recover from the disaster impact (Blakie et al., 1994). Previous literatures 
have been consistent in identifying variables that influence social vulnerability. Among 
the widely accepted are age, race/ethnicity, gender, and socioeconomic status. These 
characteristics have direct consequences on one’s accessibility to economic resources, 
education, information, and political power and representation (Blaikie et al., 1994; 
Cutter et al., 2003; Peacock & Ragsdale, 1997; Tierney et al. 2001). In the context of 
housing recovery, the causal relationship between household/neighborhood 
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characteristics and social vulnerability in the model is expected based on research 
findings that suggest that class, home tenure, and race/ethnicity are important 
determinants of victims’ ability to marshal reconstruction finance (Bolin, 1986; Bolin & 
Bolton, 1983; Peacock & Girard, 1997; Tierney, 1997). The causal relationship between 
household/neighborhood characteristics and level/length of housing recovery reflect the 
expectation that income, home tenure, and race/ethnicity affect the housing recovery 
process.   
Disaster impact characteristics describe the physical threat of the event. A disaster 
agent may initiate a number of different threats (for a detailed discussion, please see 
Lindell & Prater, 2003). For example, hurricanes can cause damage through strong wind, 
storm surge, rain, and inland flooding. Regardless, disaster impact characteristics and 
structural vulnerability determine the level of housing damage. Given the same level of 
physical threat, more vulnerable structures are likely to experience a greater amount of 
damage. The relationship between damage and housing recovery illustrated in this model 
is straightforward. It is expected that housing with a higher level of damage will take a 
longer time to be fully reconstructed than others. Similarly, social vulnerability is 
expected to have an effect on housing recovery. Individuals and households that have 
difficulty obtaining sufficient financing are likely to have a longer housing recovery 
process.  
Community characteristics act as contextual factors. As noted previously, the level 
of pre-disaster integration between the impacted community and other 
organizations/jurisdictions (Berke et al., 1993), effective leadership of local government 
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(i.e. ability to act, knowing what to do) (Rubin, 1991), and pre-disaster housing recovery 
plan (Schwab et al., 1998) are able to improve the ability of a community to marshal 
external resources and accelerate the overall recovery process.  
Research Hypotheses  
To determine how the housing recovery process varies across households, the 
relationships illustrated in the model suggest the following research hypotheses:  
H1: Rental housing units will recover significantly slower than owner-occupied housing.  
The rationale for this hypothesis is that rental properties are usually less well 
maintained and less likely to have hazard adjustments. As a consequence, rental units are 
likely to experience higher levels of damage than owner-occupied housing net of other 
factors. In addition, damaged rental properties will take longer to be repaired or 
reconstructed because landlords are slower to initiate the recovery process.   
H2: Post-disaster home sales will have a significant negative effect on housing recovery.  
The rationale for this hypothesis is that home sales immediately following the 
disaster, for whatever reason, will prolong the time needed for recovery tasks such as 
building inspection, permit application, and housing reconstruction. 
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Figure 2.2. Causal Model of Permanent Housing Recovery 
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To examine variations in the housing recovery process across neighborhoods, the 
relationships illustrated in the model suggest the following five hypotheses:   
H3: Neighborhood minority composition will have a significantly negative effect on 
housing recovery. 
The rationale for this hypothesis is that minorities are often segregated into certain 
neighborhoods where homes are likely to be old housing that were built according to less 
stringent building codes using low quality materials, and were less well maintained. As a 
result, these homes are more likely to experience higher level of damages net of other 
factors. In addition, minority households face a great number of obstacles in marshaling 
sufficient recovery resources.   
H4: Neighborhood income level will have a significantly positive effect on housing 
recovery.      
The rationale for this hypothesis is that households with similar income levels are 
often clustered in certain neighborhoods. Homes in low-income areas are likely to be 
low quality, poorly maintained, and consequently experience high levels of damage net 
of other factors. In addition, income level also determines the likelihood of acquiring 
sufficient recovery resources.   
H5: In Miami-Dade County, neighborhood Cuban composition will have a significantly 
positive effect on housing recovery. 
H6: Neighborhood non-Hispanic Blacks composition will have a significant negative 
effect on housing recovery net of other factors. 
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H7: Neighborhood non-Cuban Hispanics composition will have a significant negative 
effect on housing recovery net of other factors.  
The rationale for hypotheses 5 to 7 is that Cuban Hispanics have gained political 
and economic power in Miami-Dade County. As suggested by Peacock and Girard 
(1997), Cubans were no different from Anglos in terms of having quality home 
insurance and sufficient insurance settlements for reconstruction following Hurricane 
Andrew. On the other hand, non-Cubans and non-Hispanic Blacks are still experiencing 
great difficulties in obtaining recovery resources.     
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CHAPTER III  
METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO THE ASSESSMENT OF HOUSING 
RECOVERY 
Proper datasets are essential to conduct a rigorous study of the housing recovery 
process and identify the major factors in play. Equally important are the analytical 
techniques used to conduct data analysis. In the following sections, the ideal datasets and 
analytical strategies are discussed without recognition of any practical constraints such 
as time and resources. There is a good reason for laying out this “ideal” approach 
because it sets a goal of what the research design should be and thus encourages 
researchers to narrow the gap between the “best available” and the “ideal”. The last 
section discusses the analytical approach for data coming from different aggregation 
levels. This is a very common data issue in studying housing recovery as some variables 
are available at the household level, while others exist only at a higher level such as a 
neighborhood.  
General Principles  
A disaster is an interruption of the normal housing accumulation process. The 
research design for examining housing recovery must be able to identify the abrupt 
changes caused by the event and the following restoration process. When determining 
the major factors in play during the post-disaster recovery process, the design should be 
able to discern their baseline and recovery effects. This is because many variables (such 
as home ownership) that may drive the recovery process were already in play prior to the 
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disaster. To fulfill these purposes, the following principles should be incorporated when 
compiling a dataset and designing an analytical approach.    
Dataset 
The dataset must be longitudinal. It can be either independently pooled cross 
sectional data or panel data on housing status in the impacted community for both the 
pre- and post- disaster periods. In addition to be longitudinal, data must be appropriately 
timed in order to accurately assess the abrupt changes caused by the disaster (damage) 
and the recovery process. Small, equal time interval between data points provides higher 
accuracy. Independently pooled cross-sectional data is obtained by sampling randomly at 
different points in time. Because samples are randomly drawn each time with no need to 
monitor the observations of previous time period, data collection in this design is easier 
to manage compared to panel data. However, repeated sampling introduces differences 
between samples drawn at each point in time. Panel data have an advantage over 
independently pooled cross-sectional data because data can track the same set of samples 
over time. The problem of unobserved heterogeneity for longitudinal research can be 
better controlled in a panel design.  
A quasi-experimental design is an alterative strategy in which a control group of 
households is selected in a comparable community which did not experience the disaster. 
This control group provides an indicator of the “normal” process the experimental group 
(impacted households) would have reached had it not been for the disaster. Comparison 
between the “normal” community and the disaster stricken community reveals the 
disaster damage and the recovery level at each point of time. The success of a quasi-
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experiment design depends upon the comparability of the control group and the 
experimental group. Ideally, households should be randomly selected and assigned to the 
experimental group and the control group. In this way, households in both groups are 
statistically equal with respect to the relevant household characteristics. Then, the 
treatment (disaster impact) is introduced only into the experimental group. However, in 
the study of post-disaster housing recovery, the ideal conditions listed above are often 
impossible to attain. First of all, the household characteristics in the experimental group 
(impacted area) and those in the control group are not necessarily comparable to begin 
with. Second, it is well possible that households in the impact area may change at a 
different rate from those in the control group even before the disaster occurs. Thus the 
differences between two groups may not due to the disaster related effects. Third, it is 
likely that the impact of disaster may spillover to the control group even if this group 
escapes the direct damage. The influx of population from the disaster impact area (the 
experimental group) into the non-impact area (the control group) represents one example 
of this spill over effect. Thus, the treatment is not kept exclusively in the experimental 
group. As a result, part of change in the control group must be attributed to the disaster 
impact. Because of these difficulties, quasi-experimental design should be implemented 
with caution.   
To understand housing recovery variations across households in the impact area, 
data on theoretically important explanatory variables such as household income, damage 
level, homeownership, race/ethnicity, education, occupation, insurance settlements, and 
the amount of government grants and low-interest loans need to be gathered.   Similarly, 
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understanding of housing recovery variations across neighborhoods requires information 
on variables such as race/ethnicity composition and neighborhood income level.     
Analytical Approaches 
Ordinary least square (OLS) regression can be used to analyze pooled cross-
sectional data. Because the data are independently sampled, it rules out correlations 
across different observations and time periods when pooling data of multiple time points 
(Wooldridge, 2003). In the regressions of predicting housing status, housing damage 
caused by a disaster and the following recovery process are estimated by including 
dummy variables for all but the time point right before the disaster. In this way, the 
estimated coefficient of the time dummy immediately following the disaster represents 
the housing damage. Similarly, estimates of the subsequent time dummies represent the 
recovery level at each time point. The effects of independent variables on housing 
recovery can be estimated by including the interactions of time dummies and 
explanatory variables into the regression model. The estimates of these interactions 
represent the effects of independent variables at each time point. Changes in the 
coefficient for a variable can be used to identify the major factors that determine housing 
recovery process. For example, if the positive coefficients for home ownership in the 
post-disaster period are significantly greater than those of the pre-disaster period, then 
one can say owner occupied housing recovers more rapidly than rental units.  
For a panel dataset, analysis can be done in several ways. Because housing status is 
measured on the same set of samples over time, one has at least three options for the 
dependent variable: housing status, changes in housing status, and the percentage 
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changes of housing status. The first option is to use housing status directly in the model. 
With the second option, changes in housing status are obtained by differencing the 
housing status at one point with that of the previous time point for all observations. In a 
slightly different way, percentage changes of housing status are change ratio instead of 
the absolute differences of housing status at one point from that of the previous time 
point. When using housing status directly as the dependent variable in the regression, the 
estimations of housing damage and recovery process can be achieved by including 
dummy variables for all but the time point right before the disaster. Similarly, the effects 
of explanatory variables on housing recovery can be estimated by interacting time 
dummies with these variables. The changes of the estimated coefficients over time 
provide evidence for the effect of a particular independent variable on housing recovery. 
On the other hand, when using the changes of housing status, both absolute changes and 
percentage changes, as the dependent variable, the coefficients of the explanatory 
variables are themselves the effects of these variables on housing recovery. Both fixed 
effect model and random effect model (Baltagi, 2005; Halaby, 2004; Wooldridge, 2003) 
can be used to conduct the estimation. However, unlike the independently pooled cross-
sectional data, serial correlation is likely existing in panel datasets because the same 
group of households is sampled over time. Currently, advances in dynamic panel 
analysis and autoregressive panel analysis provide solutions for addressing this problem 
(Baltagi, 2005; Halaby, 2004).  
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Figure 3.1. A Hypothetical Housing Recovery Trajectory 
 
Panel data also make it possible to explicitly identify the housing trajectory for 
each sample, which describes the changing housing status at different time points before 
and after the disaster. This leads to another analytical approach. To construct the housing 
trajectories, the dependent variable that describes housing status is regressed on the time 
variables. Figure 3.1 provides a hypothetical case, although the reality may vary from 
household to household. Here the black dots are observed housing status and the solid 
line is the fitted housing trajectory. The timeline is categorized into four consecutive 
periods: pre-disaster, disaster, restoration and long-term recovery, where the housing 
trajectory shows distinctive pattern during each period.  
For the convenience of discussion, the pre-disaster (segment AB) housing status is 
assumed to be moving monotonically upward (although this is not a necessary 
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assumption because the trend could be monotonically downward or even nonmonotonic). 
The housing status is assumed to drop to a lower level after the disaster impact (segment 
BC; this is obviously a necessary assumption). The difference between point B and point 
C represents the abrupt change (damage) caused by the disaster as they are the two 
closest observations that bracket the disaster. The next period is called restoration 
(segment CD) which represents the post-disaster period when major home repairs or 
reconstructions are undertaken. The housing status change in this period is assumed to 
have a steeper slope compared to the pre-disaster period (of course, some homes may 
have a flatter or even downward curves suggesting slower home restoration or even 
further deteriorations). The last period is called long-term recovery (segment DE) during 
which the pace of housing status change is assumed to stabilize. The effect of disaster 
impact fades away gradually from this period on and the line between recovery and 
normalcy becomes blurred.  
Having defined the parameters of the housing trajectory, the next stage of the 
analysis is to identify the factors that explain the variation of these trajectories among 
households in the disaster impact community. The estimated parameters in the first step 
become the dependent variables at this stage, which are regressed on other theoretically 
important explanatory variables (i.e. household income). As an example, Figure 3.2 
illustrates two hypothetical trajectories showing the effect of household income while 
other variables are held constant. In this highly simplified model, segments CD1 and CD2 
represent the restoration processes of high income households and low income 
households respectively. High income households have the higher rate of recovery 
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(slope of CD1). The inequality between high income households and low income 
households increase during this period. Similarly, segments D1E1 and D2E2 represent the 
long term recovery process for high income households and low income households 
respectively. Both trajectories become flatter as major reconstruction is finished. 
However, the inequality between these two groups still exists. Presumably, the effects of 
other factors (i.e. home ownership, damage level, and household race/ethnicity) on the 
characteristics of housing trajectories can be depicted in a similar way.  
The analytical approach described above has been widely used in educational 
research under different labels. The model is a hierarchical model (Bryk & Raudenbush, 
1992) in a sense that the parameters estimated at the first stage are, in turn, dependent on 
variables at the second stage. The model is also known as a multi-level model (Goldstein, 
1995) because it describes data that vary at two levels: within households and between 
households. In particular, this model is also a random coefficients model (Longford, 
1993) because the parameters of the first stage vary randomly over households at the 
second stage.  
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Figure 3.2. Hypothetical Housing Recovery Trajectories for Household with Different 
Characteristics 
 
The Issue of Multi-Level Data   
When both household data and neighborhood data are used in the analysis 
discussed in the above section, the regression is likely to be contaminated by 
misestimated standard errors and the existence of heterogeneity. Consequently, the 
hypothesis tests could be misleading. Misestimated standard errors occur because of the 
similarity among individual households within the same neighborhood. For example, 
residential segregation in most American cities still remains at a very high level (Massey 
& Denton, 1992). Households very often are surrounded by other households with 
similar income level or race/ethnicity. Heterogeneity of regression occurs when the 
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relationship between household characteristics and housing recovery vary across 
neighborhoods. 
One approach to resolve such problem is to run the models with the Huber-White 
robust standard error (Huber, 1967; White, 1980, 1982). In this way, the estimation 
becomes robust to the threat of autocorrelation and heterogeneity when incorporating 
both household data and neighborhood data in the model at the same time. The 
hierarchical model (sometimes also named as multi-level model, random coefficients 
model) (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992; Goldstein, 1995; Longford, 1993) offers another 
solution. It resolves the problem of misestimated standard errors by incorporating a 
unique random effect for each neighborhood into the model. The variability in these 
random effects is taken into account when estimating standard errors, thus the standard 
error estimates adjust for the intraclass correlation. For the problem of heterogeneity, 
hierarchical models enable the investigator to estimate a separate set of regressions for 
each neighborhood. The variation among the neighborhoods is then explained by 
neighborhood level variables.    
To study housing recovery following Hurricane Andrew, this research collects a 
panel dataset on single family housing in Miami-Dade County for both pre-event and 
post-event periods. While several options are available for analyzing such a dataset, as 
discussed previously, this research will adopt the hierarchical method. First, housing 
trajectory of each household in the sample is modeled. This part of analysis describes the 
changing housing status of each sample at different time points before and after the 
disaster. At the next stage of analysis, household variables and neighborhood variables 
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are used to identify how housing recovery trajectory varies across households and 
neighborhoods.    
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CHAPTER IV  
METHODS 
Data Preparation 
The data used in this research comes from three sources: the Miami-Dade County 
housing tax appraisal database from 1992 to 1996, the Miami-Dade County 1990 census 
data at both block level (the Summary File 1, SF1) and block group level (the Summary 
File 2, SF2), and the census TIGER/Line data for Miami-Dade County. The tax appraisal 
data covers every single land parcel in Miami-Dade County. For residential parcels, it 
provides detailed information on housing characteristics such as number of bedrooms 
and  bathrooms. It also includes appraised building value for each year. In addition, the 
status of home tenure can be derived from the appraisal tax data as well. Census SF1 and 
SF2 files contain socio-demographic (i.e. percentage figures of population composition 
for each unit) and socio-economic data (i.e. median household income). The 
TIGER/Line data contains geographic boundary definition for both census block and 
census block group.    
Data preparation using these three data sources was conducted using the following 
steps. The census TIGER/Line file was first imported into the geographic information 
system (ARCGIS 9.1). Then a census block boundary GIS layer and a block group 
boundary GIS layer were generated. In the following step, block census data (SF1) and 
block group census data (SF2) were merged into these GIS layers. Finally, tax appraisal 
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data from different years were merged∗, geo-coded and then merged into these GIS 
layers using ARCGIS 9.1. In this way, each parcel in the tax appraisal data was assigned 
the block/block group information in which it was located. In addition, the location of 
each parcel relative to the hurricane path was generated in GIS by overlaying the geo-
coded tax appraisal data with the impact zone map of Hurricane Andrew (Figure 4.1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1. Hurricane Andrew Impact Zones (sources: Peacock & Girard, 1997) 
 
                                                 
∗
 This part of data preparation was mainly done by Dr. Walter G. Peacock. 
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Measuring Housing Recovery 
Very few attempts have been done in the literature to measure housing recovery 
directly. Nevertheless, housing is a critical element of overall household recovery. 
Household recovery has been measured in a number of ways in previous research. In 
Bolin and his colleagues’ research on household recovery following a disaster in the 
United States and in Nicaragua (Bolin, 1986, 1993; Bolin & Bolton, 1983; Bolin & 
Trainer, 1978), income recovery, house-size recovery, and recovery of household 
conveniences were used to measure the level of household recovery. Hence, a household 
was said to have achieved housing recovery if their home returned to the same size and 
had the same conveniences. Bates and his colleagues introduced the Domestic Assets 
Index, a more expanded measure of recovery for studying household recovery following 
the Guatemalan earthquake (Bates, 1982; Bates & Peacock, 1992; Peacock et al., 1987). 
They suggested that household damage and recovery should be measured by first 
determining the value of the material assets employed by a household to carry out 
normal household functions (i.e., shelter, sleeping, food preparation, food storage, etc.). 
Taken as a whole, these assets were termed the Domestic Assets Index (Bates & Peacock, 
1992). Recovery was then defined as obtaining the level of assets a household could be 
expected to have had the disaster not occurred. Simply reaccumulating the level of assets 
a household had prior to an event was, however, termed restoration. In order to measure 
recovery conceptualized in this manner, they developed a model of normal accumulation 
and then contrasted the assets a household accumulated by a particular time with the 
level of assets they would have been expected to accumulate had no impact occurred. 
  
40 
Hence, reaching the expected level of assets accumulation represented recovery, 
reaching higher levels amounted to over-recovery, and falling below expected levels was 
under-recovery (Peacock et al., 1987). To operationalize this conceptualization, Bates 
and colleagues utilized data from two panels of households, one panel impacted by a 
disaster and the other, comparison panel, not directly impacted by the event. Normal 
accumulation was modeled using the ‘comparison’ panel of households. 
In many respects, the Domestic Assets Index represents an ideal measure of 
household recovery. While the researchers had to rely on retrospective data, they were 
able to model normal accumulation processes in order to measure recovery levels for a 
specific point in time following a disaster. However, the success of this approach 
depends upon the availability of a comparison group of households, which, as discussed 
in previous section, could be a challenge. 
In research conducted at an aggregated level, community overall housing recovery, 
instead of household housing recovery, was measured. When studying housing 
reconstruction following the Northridge Earthquake in the city of Los Angeles and the 
Chi-Chi Earthquake in Taiwan, Spangle Association (1998) and Wu and Lindell (2004) 
used the number of housing rebuilding permits issued per month above the normal 
baseline level as an indicator of the post-disaster recovery process in the impacted 
community. The number of permits issued per month took several months to reach a 
peak which indicated that a massive housing reconstruction was underway. Then, the 
number trailed off and gradually fell back to the baseline level. In this way, faster 
housing reconstruction means that the number of issued permits takes a shorter period of 
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time to return to the normal level. Wright et al. (1979) used total number of housing 
units in census tracts or counties in 1960 and 1970 to track long-range housing recovery.  
Measuring Housing Recovery Using Appraised Housing Value 
This research employs the appraised value of a home from 1992 to 1996 to access 
disaster damage on housing and the recovery process following Hurricane Andrew. The 
annual appraisal process in Miami-Dade County begins during the first half of the year 
when the tax assessor’s office appraises the value of real property throughout the county. 
Land value of each parcel and the value of any structures located on the property are 
appraised separately and then combined. In late August and early September, initial 
property appraisals are sent out to all property owners. During the following months 
property owners can challenge the appraisals and adjustments are made through 
December. In January the tax bills are sent out and the state is provided with the official 
assessments for real properties within a county.  
It just so happened that the appraisal notices for the 1992 property tax were in the 
mail and were being delivered at about the same time Hurricane Andrew hit on August 
24, 1992. Many homeowners received a property appraisal notice that was far above the 
value of the home after Hurricane Andrew struck. And yet, despite the sometimes 
incredible disparities, these assessments stood. However, the county did promise that 
assessments in subsequent years would accordingly reflect the state of their property. In 
the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew, the Miami-Dade tax assessors office undertook a 
detailed inspection of homes in South Dade during 1993 and many years after in order to 
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properly capture property values. Indeed, there was an extra incentive to insure that 
assessments in the county accurately reflected the value of property because an 
amendment was passed that would cap property tax increases from 1996 to a maximum 
of 3% for current homeowners. Since the property appraisal includes a separate value for 
the building located on the parcel, and this value can be use to track the change in its 
value due to damage and subsequent rebuilding, it was decided to attempt to use the 
property appraisal to track disaster damage and recovery following Hurricane Andrew.  
The appraisal data lists the value of all types of parcels, which are classified by the 
county into land use codes reflecting the nature of the property and how its value is 
distributed among the owners of the property. For example, residential parcels are 
categorized into single family, duplexes, multi-family housing, cluster homes, 
condominiums, town houses, mixed residential, etc. This research focuses on single 
family housing primarily because the complexity of property ownership for other forms 
of housing can complicate the recovery process (Comerio, 1998; Wu & Lindell, 2004) 
and because single family housing represented a dominant form in Miami-Dade County 
at the time of the hurricane.  
Utilizing tax appraisal data is not without problems. First, the timing of the 
assessments was not consistent with the disaster event itself, as mentioned above. The 
1992 building value actually reflects the value of the home several months (2-8 months) 
prior to the event and the 1993 value, which will be used to measure the housing damage, 
may include 5 to 10 months of rebuilding and repair. However, anecdotal evidence in the 
impact area after Hurricane Katrina and previous research on housing reconstruction 
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following the Northridge Earthquake (Wu & Lindell, 2004) suggest that it takes 4-5 
months or longer before mass reconstruction begins following a major natural disaster. 
Also taking into account the fact that the tax appraisal office adjusted the appraised 
value to reflect the effect of Hurricane Andrew, the timing of the 1993 tax appraisal 
value becomes a lesser problem when estimating housing damage.    
Another major problem was determining which single family parcel actually had a 
single family structure located on it. A parcel may be classified as “single family” but 
that does not mean that it actually has a complete home on the parcel. The home may be 
in the process of being built, may have existed earlier but now is only a foundation or a 
utility hook-up, or may exist in any of a seemingly infinite number of conditions. For our 
purposes, the structure on a parcel was considered a single family if the parcel had a 
county land use code or CLUC code of single family in 1992 and remained single family 
through 1996. The only exception to this rule were parcels whose CLUC changed from 
single family to vacant lot; these were included, but all other changes such as shifts to 
duplex, apartment buildings, law offices, etc, were excluded. In addition, to be 
considered as single family housing, the parcel’s building must, 1) have a value of 
$5,000 or more in 1992, 2) have at least one bedroom, 3) have at least one bathroom, 4) 
have more than 500 square feet and 5) have at least one floor. In addition, parcels with 
obvious data errors are excluded from the dataset as well. For instance, it is not possible 
that a single family house was already 3998 years old in 1992.  
This research includes only single family homes located in the area south of Kendal 
drive (south Dade County) which is the area where the main hurricane force -- hurricane 
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eye, eye wall, and adjacent edge (Peacock & Girard, 1997) -- struck (Figure 5-1). Based 
on these criteria, the final sample consisted of a maximum of 55,268 single family 
homes in which the data from 1992 through 1996 were merged. The single family homes 
located in the area north of Kendal drive (north Dade County) where Hurricane Andrew 
caused little damage are excluded from the analysis. One may think that this information 
could be used as the comparison group in a quasi-experimental design to construct a 
normal housing attainment process. However, the conditions of housing attainment in 
north Dade County and south Dade County are very different. North Dade County was 
essentially a mega-metropolitan environment as the majority proportion of single family 
homes in this area was within Miami-Metropolitan Area. On the other hand, south Dade 
County was consisted of rural areas and small cities when Hurricane Andrew occurred. 
This systematic difference between north and south Dade county makes the quasi-
experimental design problematic. 
Independent Variables 
The independent variables fall into two broad classes The first contains attributes 
of the individual housing units themselves, which are suggested by the recovery 
literature. Because our data is not an ideal random sample in which homes must be 
random and equal with regard to disaster exposure, structural characteristics that are 
normally associated with hedonic analysis and housing damage variables are included as 
well. These variables were either directly derived from the appraisal data records or 
generated by integrating tax data with other data sources. The variables include: the pre-
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disaster (1992) home characteristics (i.e. number of bedrooms, bathrooms, age), the pre-
disaster tenure status of the home (i.e., owner or renter occupied), the number of sales 
between the time of the hurricane and the assessment year, and the location of the 
property relative to the hurricane path (i.e. hurricane eye, eye wall, adjacent edge).   
Number of bedrooms, number of bathrooms, and home age are all continuous 
variables. Tenure status is entered into the analysis as a dummy coded variable where 1 
equals owner-occupied and 0 equals renter occupied. Housing damage is measured by 
the location of a property relative to the hurricane path, as the physical force of the 
hurricane varies by the distance and direction from the hurricane eye. The entire study 
area is divided into three zones -- hurricane eye, eye wall, and the adjacent edge as used 
by Peacock and Girard (1997). These variables enter the analysis as dummy coded 
variables where 1 represents the property within a certain zone, and 0 represents the 
property is outside of a certain zone.   
The second broad class of independent variables relates to neighborhood 
characteristics, which are generated from 1990 census block and block group data. These 
neighborhood level variables include median household income, racial/ethnic 
characteristics such as percent non-Hispanic White, percent Hispanics, and percent non-
Hispanic Blacks. In addition, detailed Hispanic classifications of the percent Cuban and 
non-Cuban Hispanics will also be included in the analysis.  
Table 4.1 presents a full description of the variables included in this analysis. The 
data sources that are used to generate these variables are also listed.  
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Table 4.1. List of Variables and Their Description 
Concept Variable Description Data Source 
Pre and Post-disaster Housing Condition  
 Value92 1992 Housing appraisal value (Pre-disaster housing 
value—8 to 2 months before Hurricane Andrew) 
Directly from tax 
appraisal data 
 Value93 1993 Housing appraisal value (Post-disaster housing 
value—5 to 10 months after) 
Directly from tax 
appraisal data 
 Value94 1994 Housing appraisal value (Post-disaster housing 
value—17 to 22 months after) 
Directly from tax 
appraisal data 
 Value95 1995 Building appraisal value (Post-disaster housing 
value—29 to 34 months after) 
Directly from tax 
appraisal data 
 Value96 1996 Building appraisal value (Post-disaster housing 
value—41 to 46 months after) 
Directly from tax 
appraisal data 
Household Level Variables  
 BEDROOM Bedroom number  Directly from tax 
appraisal data 
 BATH Bath number with a full bath counted as 1 and a half bath counted as 0.5   
Directly from tax 
appraisal data 
 HOME_AGE Housing age in 1992 when the disaster happened Directly from tax 
appraisal data 
 OWNERSHIP Home ownership with  owner occupied coded as 1 
and renter occupied as 0 
Generated from 
tax appraisal data 
 
EYE 
Home location relative to the path of hurricane eye: 
within 1, otherwise 0 
Tax Appraisal 
Data, Damage 
Zone Data 
 
EYEWALL 
Home location relative to the path of north hurricane 
eye wall: within 1, otherwise 0 
Tax Appraisal 
Data, Damage 
Zone Data 
 
EDGE 
Home location relative to the adjacent edge of north 
eye wall:  within 1, otherwise 0 
Tax Appraisal 
Data, Damage 
Zone Data 
 
SALE9294 
Number of sale transactions taken place between 
disaster and the time when housing value is assessed 
in  1994  
Generated from 
Tax Appraisal 
Data 
 
SALE9496 
Number of sale transactions taken place between the 
time when housing value is assessed in 1994 and that 
time in 1996 
Generated from 
Tax Appraisal 
Data 
Neighborhood Level Variables  
 
MED_INCOME 
Median household income as of 1990 census data 1990 block 
group census 
data  
 PER_WHITE Percentage non-Hispanic White as of 1990 census data  
1990 block 
census data 
 PER_HISP Percentage Hispanic as of 1990 census data 1990 block 
census data 
 PER_BLACK Percentage non-Hispanic Black as of 1990 census data 
1990 block 
census data 
 
PER_N_CUBAN 
Percentage non-Cuban Hispanic as of 1990 census 
data 
1990 block 
group census 
data 
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Table 4.1. Continued 
Concept Variable Description Data Source 
 
PER_CUBAN 
Percentage Cuban Hispanic as of 1990 census data 1990 block 
group census 
data 
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CHAPTER V  
DATA ANALYSIS 
Descriptive Statistics and Preliminary Analysis 
Table 5.1 presents the descriptive statistics for each variable using 56,288 valid 
single family households and 3688 neighborhoods in south Miami-Dade County. Several 
noteworthy points come to light in the descriptive statistics. Regarding neighborhood 
characteristics, the average household income was $43,090, with a standard deviation of 
$18,210 and a range of $145,000.  Clearly, neighborhoods in the study area vary to a 
good extent in terms of median household income. Neighborhoods in this area had an 
average of 54.50% of Whites, 27.44% of Hispanics, and 18.06% of Blacks. While 
Anglos were still majorities, Hispanics and Blacks accounted for almost half of the 
population.  Anglo percentage had a standard deviation of 23.57, which was comparable 
to the standard deviation of Black percentage (23.51). On the other hand, the standard 
deviation of Hispanic percentage was much smaller (15.99). Clearly, Anglos and Blacks 
were more segregated than were Hispanics. Some neighborhoods were essentially 
consisted of only Blacks (max = 99.06%) or Anglos (max. = 94.83%). After dividing 
Hispanics into Cubans and non-Cubans, Cubans accounted for 16.38% population in the 
study area, with non-Cubans accounting for 11.06%. Comparing to Anglos and Blacks, 
these two groups were less segregated. Cuban percentage had a standard deviation of 
9.98 and non-Cuban percentage had a standard deviation of 8.64. They were both 
considerably smaller than that of Anglos percentage and Black percentage.  
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Table 5.1. Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
 
 Neighborhood level variables (N=3688) 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
MED_INCOME* 43.09 18.21 5.00 150.00 
PER_WHITE 54.50 23.57 0.27 94.83 
PER_HISP 27.44 15.99 0.67 68.00 
PER_BLACK 18.06 23.51 0.00 99.06 
PER_N_CUBAN 11.06 8.64 0.00 61.99 
PER_CUBAN 16.38 9.98 0.67 36.70  
  
Household level variables (N =56288) 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Value92* 59.47 53.01 5.00 1358.29 
Value93* 29.51 46.10 0.00 1274.09 
Value94* 59.64 52.88 0.00 1353.30 
Value95* 64.00 58.38 0.00 1592.58 
Value96* 68.32 59.21 0.00 1592.58 
BEDROOM 3.28 0.73 1.00 10.00 
BATH 1.94 0.65 1.00 9.00 
HOME_AGE 22.31 11.68 0.00 91.00 
OWNERSHIP 0.86 0.35 0.00 1.00 
EYE 0.34 0.48 0.00 1.00 
EYEWALL 0.58 0.49 0.00 1.00 
EDGE 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 
SALE9294 0.26 0.52 0.00 4.00 
SALE9496 0.17 0.44 0.00 5.00 
  
*: in thousand dollars. 
 
Regarding household characteristics, the average age of housing in south Dade was 
almost 23 years at the time of the hurricane, indicating that while this was an area of 
prime growth, it also was an area with a considerable number of older established 
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housing units. On the whole, 86 percent of single family homes were owner occupied. 
34% of single family homes were located in the path of hurricane eye. While this area is 
the most damaged area, it was consisted of large proportion of rural land and natural 
conservation land. The human settlement mainly concentrated in two incorporated area: 
Florida City and Homestead. In the eye wall area, the density was considerable higher. 
58% of single family homes were located in this area. The adjacent edge was a small 
area below Kendall drive. 8% of single family homes were located in this area.   Home 
sales were frequent following the hurricane -- each home was sold an average of 0.26 
times within two years after Hurricane Andrew (SALE9294). Some homes were sold as 
many as four times during this period. In the following two years (SALE9496), the 
average number of home sales diminished (0.17), while some homes were sold as many 
as 5 times. In 1992, prior to Hurricane Andrew, single family housing in South Dade 
County had an average home value of $59,470 and a maximum value of nearly $1.4 
million. Noted that this represents only the value of the structure, not the property upon 
which it was located. In 1993, the average home value fell to $29,506. By the 1994 
assessment, 17-22 months after the storm, the average home value had risen to $59,638. 
In the following two years (1995 and 1996), the average home value was $64,000 and 
$68,320 respectively.     
In addressing the first research objective, assessing the housing recovery process, 
Table 5.2 provides more detailed summary statistics of changes in home values. 
Compared to pre-disaster (1992) assessment, the average home value declined by almost 
$30,000 or 50.4% in 1993. Almost all homes (more than 99%) had a value below their 
  
51 
1992 levels. In 1994, the average home value represented a gain of $168 over its 1992 
value; however, 32% of homes had not reached their pre-disaster levels. At the time of 
the 1995 assessment, 29 to 34 months after the storm, the average home value was 
$64,004, representing a gain of $4,534 over 1992 value. Yet, nearly 21% of the homes 
were still below their 1992 level. And finally, by 1996, 41 to 46 months later, the 
average home value was $68,324 or $8,854 above its 1992 value. Still, nearly 16% of 
homes did not reach their 1992 values. Clearly, Hurricane Andrew was a devastating 
disaster and, on average, the general pattern of recovery within two years seems to have 
held. However, it is equally clear that the average pattern was not the case for a sizeable 
proportion of these properties, with 32% in 1994, nearly 21% in 1995, and nearly 16% in 
1996 not reaching their pre-storm home value. 
Table 5.2. Average Single Family Housing Value before and after Hurricane Andrew 
 
  1992 
(2-8 months 
before)  
1993 
(5-10 months) 
1994 
(17-22 months) 
1995 
(29-34 months) 
1996 
(41-46 months) 
Avg. Value $59,470 $29,506 $59,638 $64,004 $68,324 
Loss/Gain  -$29,964 $168 $4,534 $8,854 
% Loss/Gain  -50.4% 0.2% 7.6% 14.9% 
% of Housing 
Units Below 92  99% 32% 21% 16% 
 
With regard to the second research objective, identifying major factors that 
affected housing damage and the recovery process, Table 5.3 lists the intercorrelations 
among all variables. Home age had significant negative correlations with home values 
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Table 5.3. Intercorrelations of Variables 
 
 Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
1 Value92                    
2 Value93 .79*                   
3 Value94 .93* .79*                  
4 Value95 .95* .78* .95*                 
5 Value96 .95* .77* .94* .97*                
6 HOME_AGE -.37* -.19* -.36* -.35* -.36*               
7 BEDROOM .49* .35* .47* .47* .48* -.37*              
8 BATH .69* .53* .65* .66* .66* -.39* .63*             
9 OWNERSHIP .04* .05* .07* .05* .05* -.07* .10* .07*            
10 SALE9294 -.00* -.05* -.04* -.02* -.01* -.05* -.00* .00* -.17*           
11 SALE9496 -.00* -.01* -.02* -.01* -.01* -.00* -.02* -.00* -.06* .06*          
12 EYE -.24* -.26* -.25* -.24* -.27* .10* -.23* -.24* -.10* .06* .01*         
13 EYEWALL .12* .07* .12* .12* .15* -.06* .16* .14* .07* -.04* -.01* -.84*        
14 EDGE .19* .34* .21* .21* .21* -.06* .11* .17* .04* -.04* -.01* -.20* -.33*       
15 MED_INCOME .56* .49* .55* .56* .57* -.22* .32* .49* .06* .00* .01* -.36* .30* .08*      
16 PER_WHITE .28* .20* .28* .27* .29* -.12* .15* .33* .04* .03* .02* -.08* .06* .01* .59*     
17 PER_HISP -.04* .03* -.03* -.02* -.03* -.14* -.03* -.07* -.00* .01* .01* .09* -.21* .24* -.18* -.34*    
18 PER_BLACK -.25* -.22* -.25* -.25* -.26* .22* -.13* -.28* -.03* -.04* -.02* .02* .07* -.18* -.47* -.76* -.33*   
19 PER_CUBAN .04* .10* .05* .06* .05* -.18* .05* -.00* .02* -.01* -.01* -.10* -.02* .22* -.03* -.27* .83* -.29*  
20 PER_N_CUBAN -.11* -.03* -.09* -.09* -.11* -.07* -.10* -.12* -.03* .03* .01* .23* -.32* .19* -.25* -.31* .87* -.28* .47* 
Note: * significant at p < 0.05 
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from 1992 to 1996 (row 6, column 1 to 5). However, the magnitude of negative 
correlation in the year following the storm -- 1993 (- 0.19, row 6, column 2), though 
statistically significant, is considerably lower than the correlations in other years. This 
suggests that extensive housing damage reduced the variation of home values among 
different age groups. Moreover, the comparable correlations of 92, 94, 95, and 96 
suggest that the major disaster disruption may only last two years. Home ownership 
maintained a significant positive correlation with home value throughout the period (row 
9, column 1-5), with the positive value in 1994 (0.07, row 9 column 3) noticeably greater 
than the rest of the years. This stronger positive correlation supports the expectation that 
owner-occupied homes would recover faster than rental units. In addition, the negative 
correlation between homeownership and home age (-0.07, row 9 column 6) and the 
positive correlations with number of bedrooms (0.10 row 9 column 7) and number of 
bathrooms (0.07 row 9 column 8) suggest that rental units were likely to be older and 
smaller homes.  
Home sale has significant negative correlations with home values in the post-disaster 
period (row 10-11, column 2-5), especially in the years immediately following the storm 
(row 10, column 2, 3). The consistency of negative correlations suggests that post-
disaster home sales did slow down the recovery process. In addition, home sales had 
significant negative correlations (row 10, 11, column 9) with homeownership, 
suggesting that rental properties were more likely to be in transaction following the 
event. Moreover, positive correlations between home sales and the percentage of the 
White (row 16, column 10, 11) and positive correlations between home sales and the 
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variable Hurricane EYE (row 12, column 10, 11) suggest that post-disaster home sales 
were more likely to occur in Anglo-populated neighborhoods and in neighborhoods 
severely damaged by the storm. However, it is worthwhile to notice that although these 
correlations were statistically significant, their magnitudes were very small.  The 
consistently negative correlations between EYE and home values (row 12 column 1-5), 
the positive correlation with home age (row 12 column 6), the negative correlations with 
number of bedrooms and number of bathrooms (row 12 column 7, 8), and the negative 
correlation with homeownership (row 12 column 9) suggest that homes in the most 
damaged area were older, smaller, and more likely to be rental properties.  
When it comes to neighborhood race/ethnicity composition, the intercorrelations 
vary considerably. Percentage of White population in a neighborhood consistently had a 
significant positive correlation with home value throughout the period (row 16 column 
1-5). The magnitude of this correlation attenuated somewhat in 1993 (0.20), which, 
again, reflects the fact that the extensive housing damage in the whole area reduced the 
variation of home values between neighborhoods. However, the magnitude of positive 
correlation goes up and remains at a higher level in 1994, 1995, and 1996 (row 16, 
column 3-5). The concentration of Hispanics in an area had a significant negative 
correlation with home value except for 1993 (row 17 column 2) when a significant 
positive correlation existed. Percentage of non-Hispanic Blacks in an area has a 
significant negative correlation with home value throughout the period (row 18 column 
1-5). The magnitude of correlation, even with a minor reduction in 1993 (row 18 column 
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2), remained at a high level. Again, the attenuation of the negative correlation in 1993 
suggests that the disaster caused extensive housing damage in the whole area.  
When dividing Hispanics into Cuban-Hispanics and non-Cuban Hispanics, the 
patterns of the correlations change totally. Percentage of Cuban Hispanics consistently 
had a significant positive correlation with home value (row 19 column 1-5). In the post-
disaster years, the magnitude of positive correlation is even stronger than that in the pre-
disaster year. This pattern suggests that homes in predominantly Cuban neighborhoods 
recovered at a faster rate than homes in other areas. On the other hand, percentage of 
non-Cuban Hispanics had a significant negative correlation with home value throughout 
the period (row 20, column 1-5). While the value attenuated slightly in 1993, it returned 
to a higher level in the following years, suggesting that although Hurricane Andrew’s 
extensive damage reduced housing inequality immediately following the event, homes in 
predominantly non-Cubans areas recovered at a slow pace.   
In summary, the intercorrelations reveal the relationship between the independent 
variables and home values in the years before and after the storm. Changes of direction 
and magnitude of intercorrelations suggest that multiple variables affect housing damage 
and the recovery process. The frequently occurring attenuation of intercorrelations in 
1993 reflects the reduction of pre-disaster variation in housing values. Obviously, 
Hurricane Andrew caused extensive damage to homes of all types. The increased 
positive correlation between home ownership and home value in the post-disaster era 
confirms the expectation that owner-occupied housing would recover faster than rental 
units. The negative correlation between home sales and home values suggests that post-
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disaster home sales did slow down the recovery process. However, many of the variables 
that would be expected to affect housing recovery are themselves intercorrelated. For 
example, there are significant positive correlation between household income and 
percentage of Whites (row16 column15) and significant negative correlation between 
household income and percentage of Blacks (row 18 column 15). The zero-order 
correlation of each independent variable with the dependent variable contains indirect 
effects as well as direct effects – making it difficult to assess the unique contribution of 
each predictor. Thus, further analyses are needed to determine each individual variable’s 
effect on recovery.  
Further Analysis with Hierarchical Linear Model 
To review, we have appraised values for each single family home in south Miami-
Dade County – one pre-disaster value (1992) and four post-disaster values for four 
subsequent years. While we do not have sufficient data to estimate the pre-disaster 
housing trajectory as indicated by Figure 3.1 in CHAPTER III, these five occasions 
provide enough information to estimate housing damage, the restoration rate, and the 
rate of long-term recovery (Figure 5.1). In this model, disaster damage (segment AB) is 
measured as the difference between home values of 1992 and 1993. The restoration 
period is defined as the time between the 1993 and 1994 assessments because the 1994 
assessment represents the home value about two years after the storm (17-22 months). 
Mass home repairs and reconstruction are usually undertaken within two years following 
major disasters (Bolin, 1993; Comerio, 1998; Wu & Lindell, 2004). Our preliminary 
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analysis also shows that, on average, home value returned to what it was in 1992 during 
this period (Table 5.2), even though it was not necessarily the case for every household. 
With this definition, the home restoration rate is measured as the difference between 
home values of 1994 and 1993 (segment BC). The long-term recovery trajectory 
(segment CD) is estimated by fitting a line using home values of 1994, 1995 and 1996. 
In this way, a steeper line – greater slope – represents a faster long-term recovery.  
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Figure 5.1. Estimating Housing Damage, Restoration and Long-term Recovery 
 
For the convenience of discussion, we call the whole curve – A though D in Figure 
5.1 – the housing damage/recovery trajectory, or simply housing trajectory, in the 
following sections.   
Hurricane 
Andrew 
Disaster  Restoration  Long term recovery  
A 
B 
C 
D 
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The hierarchical linear model (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002; Singer & Willet, 2003) 
is adopted to estimate the housing damage/recovery trajectory. In this model, appraised 
home values are viewed (level 1) as nested within households, and households (level 2) 
as nested within neighborhoods (level 3). At level 1, home values are used to estimate 
each household’s damage, restoration rate, and the rate of long-term recovery. Levels 2 
and 3 model the extent that the level 1 estimations vary across households and 
neighborhoods.  
Model 1: Total Variation in Housing Trajectories  
Specifications 
This model estimated the total variation in housing damage/recovery trajectories in 
South Dade County. To model housing trajectory (level 1), each home value thnV  of 
household h , in neighborhood n , of year t was viewed as a linear function of the number 
of years this home was in the disaster period (DISASTER), restoration period 
(RESTORATON), and long term recovery period (LT_RECOVERY) at the time of t. For 
example, these variables are all coded as 0 in 1992 because the storm had not yet 
occurred. In 1993, DISASTER is equal to 1 and the other two variables remain as 0 
indicating that this home had been in the disaster period for one year. In 1994, 
DISASTER remains as the same value and RESTORATION becomes 1, indicating that 
this home had been in both the disaster and the restoration periods for one year. In 1995, 
LT_RECOVERY becomes 1. At this point, this home had been in the disaster period for 
one year, in the restoration period for one year, and also in the long-term recovery period 
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for one year. In 1996, LT_RECOVERY becomes 2 with other variables remaining as the 
same, indicating that this home had been in the long-term recover period for two years at 
this point. Table 5.4 provides a full list of the values of these variables in different years. 
The specification for housing trajectory model is:  
thnhnhnhnhnthn eRECOVERYLTNRESTORATIODISASTERV ++++= _3210 αααα  
 
Here the interception hn0α  is 1992 home value (pre-disaster). Slope hn1α  represents the 
disaster damage – the absolute home value loss. Slope hn2α  is the home restoration rate. 
Slope hn3α  represents the increase in home value per year during the long-term recovery 
period. The residual term thne  is the measurement error – the departure of the home 
value thnV  from the true value of household h. The errors of different home values are 
assumed as normal and independent random variables. Errors for home values of the 
same household are not independent, of course, but they are accounted for by including 
random effects for each household and neighborhood.  
Each parameter in level 1 model is then broken down into variations in households 
(level 2) and neighborhoods (level 3). Level 2 models are:  
 
hhn a0000 += βα , 
hhn a1101 += βα , 
hhn a2202 += βα , and 
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hhn a3303 += βα . 
Here, 00β  estimates the average of pre-disaster value in neighborhood n. 10β estimates 
the average of housing damage, 20β estimating the average home restoration, and 
30β estimating the average long term recovery rate in neighborhood n.  ha0 , ha1 , ha2 , 
and ha3 are “random effects,” representing the departure of household h from the average 
of neighborhood n. They are assumed to be independent normal variables with means of 
zero.  
Level 3 models are:  
nb00000 += γβ , 
nb11010 += γβ , 
nb22020 += γβ , and 
nb33030 += γβ . 
 
Here, γ  estimates the grand mean of each level 1 parameter: pre-disaster value, housing 
damage, home restoration, and the long term recovery rate. In the language of 
hierarchical models, the values of γ  are “fixed effects.” nb0 , nb1 , nb2 , and nb3 are 
“random effects,” representing the departure of neighborhood n from the grand mean. 
They are assumed to be independent normal variables with means of zero.  
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Table 5.4. Coding of Independent Variables in Level I Model 
 
Year DISASTER RESTORATION LT_RECOVERY 
1992 0 0 0 
1993 1 0 0 
1994 1 1 0 
1995 1 1 1 
1996 1 1 2 
 
The estimated variance/covariance matrix and the correlations among the 
household level random effects ( ha0 , ha1 , ha2 , ha3 ) and among the neighborhood level 
random effects ( nb0 , nb1 , nb2 , nb3 ) reflect the extent to which level 1 parameters vary at 
household level or neighborhood level, and how these parameters correlate with each 
other at different levels. For example, if, within the same neighborhood, households with 
higher pre-disaster value tend to have less damage and more rapid restoration and long 
term recovery, then there would be a negative correlation between the household level 
random effects ha0 and ha1 , and positive correlations between ha0  and ha2 , ha3 .  
Estimates and Interpretation 
Table 5.5 lists the estimated grand mean of pre-disaster home values, disaster 
damage, restoration rate, and the rate of long term recovery ( 30201000 ,,, γγγγ ), 
neighborhood- and household-level variations around these averages (i.e. the variance of 
the a and b values), and correlations among the pre-disaster value, disaster damage, 
restoration rate, and the rate of long-term recovery at both household and neighborhood 
levels (i.e. the correlation among the a and b values).  
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The estimates suggest several characteristics regarding housing trajectories. First, 
the storm caused an average of loss of $31,050 in home value, which was essentially 
restored in 1994 – a gain of $30,570 in average home value. In the long-term recovery 
period, housing values increased at a rate of $4,270 per year (This trajectory is plotted in 
Figure 5-1).  
Second, these estimates vary across households and neighborhoods. At the 
household level – that is, for households in the same neighborhood – the pre-disaster 
home values have a variance of 828.24. Housing damage has a smaller variance of 
427.02, suggesting that homes in the same neighborhood tended to experience similar 
losses even though their initial values could be very different. The home restoration rate 
in the same neighborhood has a variance of 538.83, suggesting households had 
differential ability to restore damage. In the long term recovery period, the variation in 
home growth rate is considerably smaller (39.70), suggesting home values in the same 
neighborhood grew at a similar rate during this period. 
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Table 5.5. Model 1: Housing Trajectories across Neighborhoods and Single-family Households 
 
Household Level  
 Correlations 
 
Grand 
Mean Variance 
Initial 
Value 
Housing 
Damage 
Housing 
Restoration 
Initial housing value (1992) 60.01*** 828.24***    
Housing damage (1992-1993) -31.05*** 427.02*** -0.49***   
Housing value increase per year in the restoration period  (1993-1994) 30.57*** 538.83*** 0.42*** -0.84***  
Housing value increase per year in long-term recovery period (1994-1996)  4.27*** 39.70*** 0.37*** -0.41*** 0.01*** 
 
Neighborhood Level   
 Correlations   
 
Variance Initial Value 
Housing 
Damage 
Housing 
Restoration 
Total 
Variance 
% of Variance 
Between 
Neighborhoods 
Initial housing value (1992) 2135.29***    2963.53 72.05 
Housing damage (1992-1993) 654.70*** -0.62***   1081.72 60.52 
Housing value increase per year in the restoration period  (1993-1994) 484.80*** 0.61*** -0.96***  1023.63 47.36 
Housing value increase per year in long-term recovery period (1994-1996)  28.43*** 0.66*** -0.50*** 0.42*** 68.13 41.73 
 
*
 p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01 (two-tailed test) 
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At the neighborhood level – that is, between one neighborhood and another – the 
variances have a pattern similar to the household level. The home restoration rate varied 
to a considerable extent from neighborhood to neighborhood (484.80), while the 
variations in home growth in the long term recovery period are significantly smaller 
(28.43).  
Taking variances at household and neighborhood levels as a whole, 72.05% of 
variances of pre-disaster home values can be accounted for by neighborhood variability, 
suggesting home values vary more between neighborhoods than within neighborhoods. 
This is conceivable given the residential segregation in south Miami-Dade County. 
Homes with similar values tend to cluster together, while home values across 
neighborhoods can be very different. 60.52% of variances in home damage can be 
accounted for by neighborhood differences. This is plausible because some 
neighborhoods in the direct path of hurricane were heavily damaged, while other 
neighborhoods out of the direct path stayed relatively intact. So housing damage differs 
to a greater extent from one neighborhood to another than within a particular 
neighborhood. 47.36% of variances in the home restoration rate are between 
neighborhoods, while 52.54% are between households, suggesting both household level 
variables and neighborhood level variables played important roles in determining home 
restoration. 41.73% of variances in the rate of long term recovery are at the 
neighborhood level, and 58.27% are at the household level. Similarly, this suggests that 
both household variables and neighborhood variables are in play when determining long-
term housing recovery.  
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Third, pre-disaster home value and disaster damage affected home restoration and 
long term recovery. For households within the same neighborhood, homes with higher 
pre-disaster values lost a larger amount of value. To see this, consider the significant 
negative correlation (-0.49) between pre-disaster home value and disaster damage.∗ This 
explains how pre-disaster housing inequality was reduced by the hurricane’s impact. 
Please note that the damage estimation stands for the absolute home value loss for a 
property. Even though higher valued homes experienced larger amount of value loss, it 
may well be lower valued homes had a total destruction, while higher valued homes only 
partially damaged. The correlations between pre-disaster home value and home 
restoration and the rate of long term recovery are, however, significantly positive, 0.42 
and 0.37 respectively. It is a normal expectation that higher income families live in 
homes with higher values. So, these positive correlations suggest that high income 
households recovered more rapidly than low income households. Unsurprisingly, 
housing damage has significantly negative correlations with both home restoration (-0.84) 
and the rate of long-term recovery (-0.41). Households with higher levels of damage fell 
behind in both restoration and long-term recovery periods. While home restoration has a 
significant positive correlation with the rate of long term recovery at the household level, 
the absolute magnitude of the correlation is very small (0.01). The correlations’ pattern 
at the household level holds at the neighborhood level as well, except that the magnitude 
of correlations is much stronger at the neighborhood level. For example, the correlation 
between home restoration and the long term recovery rate is 0.42 at neighborhood level, 
                                                 
∗
 Noted that housing damages are negative values in the model. The smaller the negative value, the larger 
the absolute value loss. 
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compared to 0.01 at household level. This strong positive correlation suggests that 
neighborhoods that had a higher level of home restoration continued leading the way in 
the long term recovery period. Housing inequality between neighborhoods kept 
increasing in the period following the disaster.     
To sum up, estimates for Model 1 suggest the following: 
1. Hurricane Andrew reduced pre-disaster housing inequality in the impact area. 
However, housing inequality resumed during the recovery process. 
2. The home restoration rate varied substantially between households and 
neighborhoods. The rate of long-term recovery varied between households and 
neighborhoods as well. 
3. Homes with higher pre-disaster values had a faster rate of restoration and long-
term recovery.  
4. Homes with higher levels of damage had a slower rate of restoration and long 
term recovery. 
Model 2: The Effects of Household Characteristics 
Model 1 captures the overall variation in housing trajectory following the storm, 
suggesting that disaster damage, home restoration, and the rate of long term recovery 
varied substantially across households and neighborhoods. In model 2, we relate some of 
this variation to households’ characteristics.     
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Specifications 
The household variables OWNERSHIP, EYE, EYEWALL, and EDGE are 
incorporated into level 2 models to predict pre-disaster home value hn0α , disaster 
damage hn1α , home restoration rate hn2α , and the rate of long term recovery hn3α .  In a 
perfect random scenario, as noted previously, households would be equal with respect to 
disaster exposure. However, the reality departs from this ideal. Housing in the disaster 
impact area varies in terms of structural characteristics and building age. To account for 
this problem, variables BEDROOM, BATH, and HOME_AGE are included in the 
models as control variables.  The models are:  
h
hnhnhnhnhn
a
OWNERSHIPBATHBEDROOMAGEHOME
0
04030201000 _
+
++++= βββββα
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33635
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+++
++++=
ββ
βββββα
 
 
Here, the β s are the effects of each variable on pre-disaster home value, or disaster 
damage, or home restoration, or the rate of long-term recovery. Dummy variable EYE is 
intentionally dropped from the model to avoid multicollinearity. Thus, the homes that 
were in the path of the hurricane eye are the reference group in this model. 
, 
, 
, and 
. 
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Estimates and Interpretation 
Table 5.6 gives estimates which suggest that household characteristics affected 
housing damage/recovery trajectories.  
Before the storm, the average value of owner-occupied housing was $970 lower 
than rental units after controlling for other variables. Homes with higher age had lower 
value. Every year increase in home age, home value decreased by $1260. As expected, 
number of bedrooms and number of bathrooms both had significant positive effect on 
pre-disaster home value. One additional bedroom increased home value by $563 and one 
additional bathroom increased home value by $25,380.    
Regarding disaster damage, homes in the hurricane eye area, on average, had the 
greatest value loss, followed by the eye wall area, and then the adjacent edge area. 
Homes in the hurricane eye wall area experienced $5,370 less value loss than those in 
the hurricane eye area. Homes in the adjacent edge area experienced $35,270 less 
damage compared to the hurricane eye area. After controlling housing damage and other 
factors, the value gap between owned and rental units reversed after the disaster. Owner-
occupied homes had an average of $1,850 less damage than rental units. Larger homes 
had greater losses. One additional bedroom was associated with $3180 more damages 
and one additional bathroom was associated with $11,000 loss. 
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Table 5.6. Model 2: Explaining Pre-disaster Housing Value, Damages, Home Restoration and 
Long Term Housing Recovery by Household Characteristics 
 
 Estimation 
Initial housing value (1992)  
     Reference Group (Rental Units) 93.17*** 
     Home Age -1.26*** 
     Num. of Bedrooms 5.63*** 
     Num. of Bathrooms 25.38*** 
     Home Ownership -0.97*** 
Housing damage (1992-1993)  
     Reference Group (Rental Units & Hurricane Eye) -54.06*** 
     Home Age 0.65*** 
     Num. of Bedrooms -3.18*** 
     Num. of Bathrooms -11.00*** 
     Home Ownership 1.85*** 
     Eye Wall vs. Hurricane Eye 5.37*** 
     Adjacent Edge vs. Hurricane Eye 35.27*** 
Housing value increase per year in the restoration period  (1993-1994)  
     Reference Group (Rental Units & Hurricane Eye) 48.25*** 
     Home Age -0.63*** 
     Num. of Bedrooms 3.14*** 
     Num. of Bathrooms 8.27*** 
     Home Ownership 1.94*** 
     Eye Wall vs. Hurricane Eye -3.33*** 
     Adjacent Edge vs. Hurricane Eye -26.64*** 
Housing value increase per year in long-term recovery period (1994-1996)  
     Reference Group (Rental Units & Hurricane Eye) 5.30*** 
     Home Age -0.04*** 
     Num. of Bedrooms 0.33*** 
     Num. of Bathrooms 2.18*** 
     Home Ownership -0.95*** 
     Eye Wall vs. Hurricane Eye 1.53*** 
     Adjacent Edge vs. Hurricane Eye 2.33*** 
    *
 p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01 (two-tailed test)         
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The advantage of owner-occupied homes over rental units became even stronger in 
the restoration period with the former, on average, having a value gain of $1,940 more 
than the latter. On average, homes in the severely stuck area (hurricane eye) restored 
$3,330 more than those in moderately struck area (eye wall), and $26,640 more than 
those in the slightly struck area (adjacent edge). However, when taking the housing 
damage into account, homes in the hurricane eye area were still worse off by an average 
of $2,040 ($5,370 – 3,330) and $8,630 ($35,270-26,640) respectively compared to those 
in the eye wall area and the adjacent edge area. This suggests that the overall gap among 
areas with different damage levels increased during the restoration period.  
In the long-term recovery period, owners’ advantage was reduced. The annual 
value increase of owner-occupied homes was $950 less than rental homes. This may 
suggest that rental properties were still under reconstruction while owner-occupied units 
were essentially finished. Given the huge advantage owner-occupied homes had in term 
of less damage and faster restoration, the inequality between owner-occupied units and 
rental units remained at a higher level during this period compared to the pre-disaster 
period. Home values in the moderately damaged area (eye wall) grew $1,530/year faster 
than those in the severely damaged area (hurricane eye). And, home values in the 
slightly damaged area (adjacent edge) grew $2,330/year faster than the homes in the 
hurricane eye area.  Clearly, the housing inequality among these three areas continued 
increasing during this period.  
Figure 5.2 plots the average trajectories for owner-occupied homes and rental units 
in the hurricane eye area (EYEWALL = 0, EDGE = 0), setting other variables at their 
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sample means (HOME_AGE = 22.31, BEDROOM = 3.28, BATHROOM = 1.94). At the 
beginning (1992), owner-occupied housing was somewhat lower in value than rental 
units. This relationship reversed after the storm (1993). In the restoration period, owner- 
occupied housing had a clear advantage over rental units (1993-1994) when the gap 
between these two groups became significantly larger. In the long-term recovery period, 
while rental units increased at a slightly faster rate, the gap remained large until 1996.  
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Figure 5.2. Predicted Values of Single Family Homes by Home Ownership with Other Variables 
Held Constant 
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Table 5.7 lists the variances and correlations between estimates at both the 
household and neighborhood levels. Compared to Model 1, the residual variances for 
pre-disaster housing value, disaster damage, home restoration, and the long-term 
recovery rate reduced by 12% to 46%. Specifically, 46% of variance within pre-disaster 
home value, 31% variance in disaster damage, 24% of variance within home restoration, 
and 12% variance within the long-term recovery rate are explained by household 
variables incorporated in Model 2. Clearly, the variables included in this model have the 
best ability to explain the variation within pre-disaster home values, followed by housing 
damage and home restoration. However, they only have limited ability to explain the 
home value increase in the long term recovery period. This is conceivable because the 
impact of Hurricane Andrew on housing value attainment decreased as time went along. 
Housing value change may well be influenced by other variables not measured in this 
analysis in the long run.  The correlations at neighborhood level have a pattern similar to 
Model 1, except for a reduced magnitude. Home value shows significant positive 
correlations with home restoration rate and the rate of long-term recovery at both the 
household and neighborhood levels. Home restoration had a significant positive 
correlation with the long term recovery rate, suggesting that neighborhoods that restored 
at a higher rate kept grew faster than other neighborhoods. The housing inequality across 
neighborhoods were increasing following the disaster. At household level, the 
correlation between housing restoration and the long term recovery rate became 
significantly negative (-0.03) which is different from what showed in Model 1. This 
suggests that, in the same neighborhood, homes that lagged behind during the restoration 
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period caught up in the long term recovery period after controlling homeownership, 
housing structural characteristics, home age, and damage level. In other words, homes in 
the same neighborhood became less variable in the long run.  
In short, Model 2 suggests the following: 
1. Owner-occupied housing experienced less damage and faster home 
restoration compared to rental units.  
2. Housing inequality between owner-occupied housing and rental units 
increased slightly during the restoration period, but then decreased in the 
following long term recovery period.  
3. Housing inequality among the severely damaged areas (hurricane eye), the 
moderately damaged area (eye wall) and the slightly damaged area 
(adjacent edge) increased in the recovery period as the homes in severely 
damaged area lagged behind during recovery. 
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Table 5.7. Residual Variances and Correlations Matrix for Model 2 
 
Household Level 
 Correlations 
 
Variance Initial Value 
Housing 
Damage 
Housing 
Restoration 
Initial housing value (1992) 550.36***    
Housing damage (1992-1993) 369.97*** -0.37***   
Housing value increase per year in the restoration period  (1993-1994) 494.58*** 0.33*** -0.82***  
Housing value increas per year in long-term recovery period (1994-1996)  38.36*** 0.34*** -0.38*** -0.03*** 
 
Neighborhood Level   
 Correlations   
 
Variance Initial Value 
Housing 
Damage 
Housing 
Restoration 
Total 
Variance R Square 
Initial housing value (1992) 1050.74***    1601.1 0.46****** 
Housing damage (1992-1993) 378.49*** -0.49***   748.46 0.31****** 
Housing value increase per year in the restoration period  (1993-1994) 283.61*** 0.44*** -0.94***  778.19 0.24****** 
Housing value increase per year in long-term recovery period (1994-1996)  21.57*** 0.53*** -0.41*** 0.27*** 59.93 0.12****** 
 
Note: R square is the fraction by which total variance has decreased from model 1. This is the proportion of variance that can be explained by 
independent variables in model 2.   
 *
 p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01 (two-tailed test) 
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Model 3: The Effects of Post-disaster Home Sales  
This model estimates the effects of post-disaster home sales. Our expectation was 
that post-disaster home sales slowed down home restoration as well as long-term 
housing recovery. When housing was transferred repeatedly, it is conceivable that 
repairs and reconstruction were delayed.  
Specifications 
The number of home sales during the restoration period (SALE9294) is added into 
the model for the home restoration rate hn2α ; number of home sales during the long term 
recovery period (SALE9496) is added into the model for the long-term recovery 
rate hn3α . These two equations then become:  
hhnhnhn
hnhnhnhnhn
aSALEEDGEEYEWALL
OWNERSHIPBATHROOMBEDROOMAGEHOME
2272625
24232221202
9294
_
++++
++++=
βββ
βββββα
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_
++++
++++=
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βββββα
 
Estimates and Interpretation 
Estimates are listed in Table 5.8. Compared to Model 2, the key estimates are 
substantially unchanged. The results continue to suggest that owner-occupied housing 
had a significantly higher restoration rate than rental units (an average of $1,570) net of 
other variables. In the long-term recovery period, the advantage of owner-occupied 
, 
. 
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housing attenuated – with the average home value of rental units increasing $980/year 
faster than owner-occupied homes. However, the overall inequality still remained 
between owner-occupied housing and rental units at the end of 1996. Housing inequality 
in areas with different hurricane severity kept increasing in the recovery period. In 
addition, the estimates of this model show that one additional home sale in the 
restoration period reduced home restoration by $1,390. In the long-term recovery period, 
repeated home sales continued their negative effect on housing recovery, though to a 
much lesser extent. One additional home sale reduced home value by $210 per year in 
this period. Clearly, home sales significantly slowed the overall recovery process, 
especially during the restoration period.   
Table 5.9 lists the estimated residual variances and the corresponding correlation 
matrix. The correlations’ pattern remains the same as those in Model 2. Pre-disaster 
home value had significant positive correlations with both home restoration and the long 
term recovery at both household and neighborhood levels. Within the same 
neighborhood, home restoration had a significantly negative correlation with the long 
term recovery rate, suggesting that homes in the same neighborhoods became similar in 
the long run. On the other hand, home restoration and the long term recovery rate had a 
significantly positive correlation at the neighborhood level. Housing inequality between 
the leading neighborhoods and the laggard neighborhoods continued increasing during 
the recovery period.  
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Table 5.8. Model 3: Explaining Pre-disaster Housing Value, Damages, Home Restoration and 
Long Term Housing Recovery by Household Characteristics 
 
 Estimation 
Initial housing value (1992)  
     Reference Group (Rental Units) 93.17*** 
     Home Age -1.25*** 
     Num. of Bedrooms 5.63*** 
     Num. of Bathrooms 25.38*** 
     Home Ownership -0.97*** 
Housing damage (1992-1993)  
     Reference Group (Rental Units & Hurricane Eye)  -54.06*** 
     Home Age 0.65*** 
     Num. of Bedrooms -3.19*** 
     Num. of Bathrooms -11.00*** 
     Home Ownership 1.85*** 
     Eye Wall vs. Hurricane Eye 5.37*** 
     Adjacent Edge vs. Hurricane Eye 35.28*** 
Housing value increase per year in the restoration period  (1993-1994)  
     Reference Group (Rental Units & Hurricane Eye) 49.01*** 
     Home Age -0.64*** 
     Num. of Bedrooms 3.15*** 
     Num. of Bathrooms 8.30*** 
     Home Ownership 1.57*** 
     Eye Wall vs. Hurricane Eye -3.36*** 
     Adjacent Edge vs. Hurricane Eye -26.73*** 
     Num. of Home Sales between 1992 and 1994 -1.39*** 
Housing value increase per year in long-term recovery period (1994-1996)  
     Reference Group (Rental Units & Hurricane Eye) 5.33*** 
     Home Age -0.04*** 
     Num. of Bedrooms 0.33*** 
     Num. of Bathrooms 2.18*** 
     Home Ownership -0.98*** 
     Eye Wall vs. Hurricane Eye 1.53*** 
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Table 5.8. Continued 
 
 Estimation 
     Adjacent Edge vs. Hurricane Eye 2.34*** 
     Num. of Home Sales in 1995 and 1996 -0.21*** 
 
   *
 p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01 (two-tailed test) 
 
  
79
 
Table 5.9. Residual Variances and Correlations Matrix for Model 3 
 
Household Level 
 Correlations 
 
Variance Initial Value 
Housing 
Damage 
Housing 
Restoration 
Initial housing value (1992) 550.35***    
Housing damage (1992-1993) 369.98*** -0.37***   
Housing value increase per year in the restoration period  (1993-1994) 494.40*** 0.33*** -0.83***  
Housing value increase per year in long-term recovery period (1994-1996)  38.40*** 0.34*** -0.38*** -0.03*** 
 
Neighborhood Level   
 Correlations   
 
Variance Initial Value 
Housing 
Damage 
Housing 
Restoration 
Total 
Variance R Square 
Initial housing value (1992) 1050.78***    1601.13 0.46****** 
Housing damage (1992-1993) 378.36*** -0.49***   748.34 0.31****** 
Housing value increase per year in the restoration period  (1993-1994) 284.32*** 0.45*** -0.94***  778.72 0.24****** 
Housing value increase per year in long-term recovery period (1994-1996)  21.58*** 0.53*** -0.41*** 0.27*** 59.98 0.12****** 
 
Note: R square is the fraction by which total variance has decreased from model 1. This is the proportion of variance that can be explained by 
independent variables in model 3.   
 *
 p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01 (two-tailed test) 
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Model 4: The Effects of Neighborhood Level Variables  
As shown in previous models, pre-disaster home values, housing damage, the 
home restoration rate and long term recovery rate varied from one neighborhood to 
another. In this model, we relate the remaining unexplained variances in these variables 
to certain key neighborhood characteristics. 
Specifications 
Median household income (MED_INCOME), percentage of Hispanics 
(PER_HISP), percentage of non-Hispanic Blacks (PER_BLACK), and percentage of 
White (PER_WHITE) are added into the models for pre-disaster home value hn0α , 
housing damage hn1α , the home restoration rate hn2α , and the long-term recovery 
rate hn3α . PER_WHITE is treated as a reference category in this model. It is dropped to 
avoid the problem of multicollinearity. 
For the pre-disaster value hn0α , the equation becomes
∗: 
hnhnhnhnhn
hnnnnhn
abSALEEDGEEYEWALLOWNERSHIP
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____
++++++
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To recall, the γ s refer to the effects of neighborhood variables, and β s stand for 
the effects of household level variables.  
For housing damage hn1α , the equation becomes: 
                                                 
∗
 For brevity, level II model and level III model are combined here. For a full specification of models at 
different levels, please refer to the Appendix 
. 
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hnhnhnhnhn
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For the home restoration rate hn2α , the equation becomes: 
hnhnhnhnhn
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For the rate of long-term recovery hn3α , the equation becomes:  
hnhnhnhnhn
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Estimates and Interpretation 
Table 5.10 lists the estimates for this model. Compared to Models 1, 2, and 3, the 
key findings on household variables remain substantially unchanged. Regarding 
neighborhood level variables, median household income had a significantly positive 
effect on pre-disaster home value. Every thousand dollars increase of the median 
household income of a neighborhood increased home value by $910. Surprisingly, 
neighborhood minority concentration, both non-Hispanic Blacks and Hispanics, had a 
significantly positive effect on pre-disaster home values. This is different from previous 
research that suggested high level of minority concentration has negative effect on home 
values (Stinchcombe, 1965; Logan & Molotch, 1987; South & Crowder, 1997). 
Considering the tax appraisal process in Miami-Dade, the initial property tax 
assessments of 1992 were completed before Hurricane Andrew hit on August 24th 1992. 
. 
. 
. 
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It may well be that many homeowners received a property appraisal notice that was far 
above the value of damaged home. Despite this incredible inconsistency, Miami-Dade 
County kept the assessments of 1992 and promised to make appropriate adjustments in 
the following year to reflect home damage. However, it could not rule out the possibility 
of tax appraisal values being adjusted for some properties in 1992. The lower pre-
disaster home value of Anglo concentrated neighborhoods shown in this model may 
reveal the fact that tax assessments in such neighborhoods were systematically adjusted 
downward in 1992.  
Table 5.10. Model 4: Explaining Pre-disaster Housing Value, Damages, Home Restoration and 
Long Term Housing Recovery by Household and Neighborhood Characteristics 
 
 Estimation 
Initial housing value (1992)  
     Reference Group (Rental Units & Percentage of White Population) 91.34*** 
     Home Age -1.20*** 
     Num. of Bedrooms 5.51*** 
     Num. of Bathrooms 24.98*** 
     Home Ownership -1.19*** 
     Median Household Income 0.91*** 
     Percentage of Hispanic Population 0.10*** 
     Percentage of Non-Hispanic Black Population 0.12*** 
Housing damage (1992-1993)  
     Reference Group (Rental Units & Percentage of White Population & Eye) -52.15*** 
     Home Age 0.65*** 
     Num. of Bedrooms -3.20*** 
     Num. of Bathrooms -10.86*** 
     Home Ownership 1.91*** 
     Eye Wall vs. Hurricane Eye 1.94*** 
     Adjacent Edge vs. Hurricane Eye 32.07*** 
     Median Household Income -0.02*** 
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Table 5.10. Continued 
     Percentage of Hispanic Population 0.16*** 
     Percentage of Non-Hispanic Black Population 0.08*** 
Housing value increase per year in the restoration period  (1993-1994)  
    Reference Group (Rental Units & Percentage of White Population & Eye) 47.55*** 
     Home Age -0.66*** 
     Num. of Bedrooms 3.17*** 
     Num. of Bathrooms 7.98*** 
     Home Ownership 1.48*** 
     Eye Wall vs. Hurricane Eye -1.26*** 
     Adjacent Edge vs. Hurricane Eye -24.27*** 
     Num. of Home Sales between 1992 and 1994 -1.42*** 
     Median Household Income 0.05*** 
     Percentage of Hispanic Population -0.14*** 
     Percentage of Non-Hispanic Black Population -0.08*** 
Housing value increase per year in long-term recovery period (1994-1996)  
     Reference Group (Rental Units & Percentage of White Population & Eye) 5.09*** 
     Home Age -0.03*** 
     Num. of Bedrooms 0.32*** 
     Num. of Bathrooms 2.18*** 
     Home Ownership -0.99*** 
     Eye Wall vs. Hurricane Eye 1.63*** 
     Adjacent Edge vs. Hurricane Eye 2.13*** 
     Num. of Home Sales in 1995 and 1996 -0.21*** 
     Median Household Income 0.07*** 
     Percentage of Hispanic Population 0.03*** 
     Percentage of Non-Hispanic Black Population -0.06*** 
       *
 p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01 (two-tailed test) 
 
The estimates of housing damage suggest that median household income had no 
effect on home value loss (-0.02 is not significant). Homes in minority populated 
neighborhoods experienced less dollar value loss than homes in Anglo neighborhoods. 
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To see this, consider the significant positive effects of non-Hispanic Blacks and 
Hispanics on housing damage. Every percent increase of Hispanic concentration in a 
neighborhood resulted in $160 less home loss. Every percent increase of Black 
concentration resulted in $80 less home loss. In the restoration period, median household 
income had a significant positive effect with every additional thousand dollars 
associating $50 increase in home restoration. The disadvantage of locating in minority 
populated neighborhoods was significant in this period. Every percent increase of 
Hispanics in a neighborhood slowed home restoration by an average of $140 and every 
percent increase of Blacks slowed down the restoration by an average of $80. These 
negative effects can accumulate to a considerable level for the predominantly minority 
neighborhoods. For example, homes in a neighborhood with 60% Hispanics restored an 
average of $7,000 less than those in a neighborhood that had 10% Hispanics. Homes in a 
neighborhood with 90% Blacks restored $6,400 slower than those in a neighborhood of 
10% Blacks. Noted that the average home value in neighborhoods with 90% and more 
Blacks was only $27,418 before the disaster occurred, $6,400 could mean a substantial 
proportion of some homes in these areas. In the long term recovery period, median 
household income continued its positive effect. The concentration of Hispanics in a 
neighborhood began showing a positive effect on home growth. Every percent increase 
of Hispanics was associated with an additional $30/year home value increase. The 
positive effect of Hispanic concentration in the long term recovery period suggests that 
although homes in predominantly Hispanic neighborhoods were restored slower in the 
early recovery period, they began to pick up in the following years. The negative effect 
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of non-Hispanic Blacks, however still remained significant during this period. Every 
percent increase of Blacks in a neighborhood reduced home value growth by $60/year.   
In summary, median household income had a significant positive effect on housing 
recovery with neighborhoods with higher income neighborhoods leading the way in both 
restoration period and the long term recovery period. Clearly, housing inequality 
between neighborhoods with different income levels increased following Hurricane 
Andrew. While neighborhood minority composition – both Hispanics and Blacks – had 
significant negative effects on housing recovery in the restoration period, Hispanic 
concentration began having a positive effect in the long term recovery period, while the 
effect of Blacks concentration still remain significantly negative.  
Table 5.11 presents the residual variances and the corresponding correlation matrix. 
Compared to Model 3, neighborhood income and race/ethnicity composition explained 
an additional 9% of variances in pre-disaster home values, an additional 1% of variances 
in housing damage, an additional 1% of variances in the home restoration rate, and an 
additional 2% of variances in the rate of long-term housing recovery. Overall, 55% of 
variances in pre-disaster home values, 32% of variance in housing damage, 25% of 
variance in home restoration, and 14% of variance in the long term recovery rate were 
explained by the independent variables included in this model. The different R squares 
reflect that the independent variables have the best ability to explain pre-disaster home 
values, followed by housing damage and home restoration. However, these variables 
have a relatively limited ability to explain the housing value attainment in the long run. 
This is probably because other unmeasured variables may also play an important role in 
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determining housing value increase when the impact of Hurricane Andrew faded away.   
Again, the correlation matrix reflects the same pattern as in Models 2 and 3. Pre-disaster 
home value had significant positive correlations with both home restoration and the long 
term recovery at both household and neighborhood levels. Within the same 
neighborhood, home restoration had a significantly negative correlation with the long 
term recovery rate. It suggests that while homes in the same neighborhoods varied in 
terms of recovery progress with some leading the way and other falling behind, those 
lagging behind caught up in the long run and homes in the same neighborhood became 
less variable. On the other hand, home restoration and the long term recovery rate had a 
significantly positive correlation at the neighborhood level. Housing inequality between 
the leading neighborhoods and the laggard neighborhoods continued increasing during 
the recovery period.  
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Table 5.11. Residual Variances and Correlations Matrix of Model 4 
 
Household Level 
 Correlations 
 
Variance Initial Value 
Housing 
Damage 
Housing 
Restoration 
Initial housing value (1992) 551.19***    
Housing damage (1992-1993) 369.90*** -0.36***   
Housing value increase per year in the restoration period  (1993-1994) 494.28*** 0.33*** -0.83***  
Housing value increase per year in long-term recovery period (1994-1996)  38.39*** 0.34*** -0.38*** -0.03*** 
 
Neighborhood Level   
 Correlations   
 
Variance Initial Value 
Housing 
Damage 
Housing 
Restoration 
Total 
Variance R Square 
Initial housing value right before the disaster (1992) 789.98***    2963.53 0.55****** 
Housing damage (1992-1993) 370.29*** -0.52***   1081.72 0.32****** 
Housing value increase per year in the restoration period  (1993-1994) 274.94*** 0.44*** -0.94***  1023.63 0.25****** 
Housing value increase per year in long-term recovery period (1994-1996)  20.01*** 0.48*** -0.41*** 0.25*** 68.13 0.14****** 
 
Note: R square is the fraction by which total variance has decreased from model 1. This is the proportion of variance that can be explained by 
independent variables in model 4.   
*
 p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01 (two-tailed test) 
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Model 5: Cuban-Hispanics vs. Non-Cuban Hispanics  
To estimate the effects of Cuban-Hispanics and non-Cuban Hispanics, the 
percentages of Cuban-Hispanics (PER_CUBAN) and non-Cuban Hispanics 
(PER_N_CUBAN) in neighborhoods, replace the percentage of Hispanics (PER_HISP), 
in this model.    
Specifications 
For the pre-disaster home value hn0α , the equation becomes: 
hnhnhn
hnhnhnn
nnnhn
abSALEEDGE
EYEWALLOWNERSHIPAGEHOMEBLACKPER
CUBANNPERCUBANPERINCOMEMED
220504
03020104
030201000
9294
__
____
++++
++++
+++=
ββ
βββγ
γγγγα
 
For housing damage hn1α , the equation becomes: 
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For the home restoration rate hn2α , the equation becomes: 
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For the rate of long-term recovery hn3α , the equation becomes:  
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Estimates and Interpretation 
As listed in Table 5.12, estimates of other variables remain essentially unchanged 
compared to Model 4. In addition, this model shows that the concentration of Cuban-
Hispanics and non-Cuban Hispanics did show different effects on pre-disaster home 
value, disaster damage and housing recovery.  Neighborhood Blacks composition and 
non-Cuban Hispanics composition had significant positive effect on pre-disaster home 
value, while Cuban-Hispanics concentration had a negative (non-significant) effect. 
Again, (recall Model 4), this is different from previous research suggesting that 
neighborhood minority composition, especially Blacks, has a negative effect on home 
values. Our results in this model may reveal the fact that Cuban-Hispanics and Anglos 
had their property tax assessments adjusted downward in 1992 to reflect the disaster 
damage. However, the initial tax assessments which were completed before Hurricane 
Andrew were maintained for Blacks and non-Cubans.   
Regarding housing damage, higher levels of Cuban, non-Cuban Hispanic and 
Black concentration in a neighborhood are all associated with lower damage. Note that 
the estimated damage stands for the absolute value loss. It may well be that some low-
valued homes experienced total destruction even though their absolute value loss was 
small. In the restoration period, neighborhoods with higher proportion of Cuban, non-
Cuban Hispanic, and Black all had negative effects. Every percent increase of Blacks 
slowed home restoration by $70, and it was $170 and $110, respectively, for every 
percent increase of Cuban Hispanics and non-Cuban Hispanics. Given the residential 
segregation in the study area, especially for Blacks, these negative effects could 
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accumulate to great levels for those highly segregated neighborhoods. For example, 
homes in a neighborhood with 90% of Blacks restored an average of $5,600 compared to 
those in a neighborhood with 10% of Blacks. It is somewhat surprising that 
neighborhood Cuban composition had the greatest negative effect on home restoration as 
previous literature suggested that Cubans had advantages over non-Cuban Hispanics and 
non-Hispanic Blacks in reaching housing recovery (Peacock and Girard 1997). The 
negative effect of Cuban Hispanics, however, quickly diminished and became 
significantly positive during the long-term recovery period. This suggests that while 
homes in Cuban neighborhoods restored slower, they began to pick up as recovery 
process went along. The effects of Blacks, however, still remained significantly negative. 
Specifically, every percent increase of neighborhood Cuban composition increased home 
value growth by $50/year. Every percent increase of Blacks slowed down home value 
growth by $50/year. The effect of non-Cuban Hispanics composition was also positive, 
not significant, though. Every percent increase increased home value growth by $10/year. 
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Table 5.12. Model 5: Explaining Pre-disaster Housing Value, Damages, Home Restoration and 
Long Term Housing Recovery by Household and Neighborhood Characteristics 
 
 Model 5 
Initial housing value (1992)  
     Reference Group (Rental Units & Percentage of White Population) 91.46*** 
     Home Age -1.20*** 
     Num. of Bedrooms 5.51*** 
     Num. of Bathrooms 24.97*** 
     Home Ownership -1.18*** 
     Median Household Income 0.94*** 
     Percentage of Non-Hispanic Black Population 0.13*** 
     Percentage of Cuban-Hispanic Population -0.07*** 
     Percentage of Non-Cuban Hispanic Population 0.25*** 
Housing damage (1992-1993)  
     Reference Group (Rental Units & Percentage of White Population & Eye) -52.35*** 
     Home Age 0.64*** 
     Num. of Bedrooms -3.20*** 
     Num. of Bathrooms -10.87*** 
     Home Ownership 1.91*** 
     Eye Wall vs. Hurricane Eye 2.39*** 
     Adjacent Edge vs. Hurricane Eye 32.45*** 
     Median Household Income -0.02*** 
     Percentage of Non-Hispanic Black Population 0.08*** 
     Percentage of Cuban-Hispanic Population 0.12*** 
     Percentage of Non-Cuban Hispanic Population 0.19*** 
Housing value increase per year in the restoration period  (1993-1994)  
    Reference Group (Rental Units & Percentage of White Population & Eye) 47.65*** 
     Home Age -0.63*** 
     Num. of Bedrooms 3.19*** 
     Num. of Bathrooms 7.96*** 
     Home Ownership 1.48*** 
     Eye Wall vs. Hurricane Eye -1.29*** 
     Adjacent Edge vs. Hurricane Eye -24.31*** 
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Table5.12. Continued 
     Num. of Home Sales between 1992 and 1994 -1.43*** 
     Median Household Income 0.06*** 
     Percentage of Non-Hispanic Black Population -0.07*** 
     Percentage of Cuban-Hispanic Population -0.17*** 
     Percentage of Non-Cuban Hispanic Population -0.11*** 
Housing value increase per year in long-term recovery period (1994-1996)  
     Reference Group (Rental Units & Percentage of White Population & Eye) 5.14*** 
     Home Age -0.03*** 
     Num. of Bedrooms 0.31*** 
     Num. of Bathrooms 2.18*** 
     Home Ownership -0.99*** 
     Eye Wall vs. Hurricane Eye 1.46*** 
     Adjacent Edge vs. Hurricane Eye 1.94*** 
     Num. of Home Sales in 1995 and 1996 -0.21*** 
     Median Household Income 0.07*** 
     Percentage of Non-Hispanic Black Population -0.05*** 
     Percentage of Cuban-Hispanic Population 0.05*** 
     Percentage of Non-Cuban Hispanic Population -0.01*** 
 
      *
 p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01 (two-tailed test) 
 
Table 5.13 provides the estimated variances and the correlation matrix for this 
model. Of course, the percentages of explained variances remain exactly same as in 
Model 4 because no additional explanatory information is added into the model when 
simply splitting PER_HISP into two variables: PER_CUBAN and PER_N_CUBAN. 
46% of variances in pre-disaster home values, 68% of variances in disaster damages, 
75% of variances in the home restoration rate, and 86% of variances in the rate of long 
term housing recovery still remain unexplained in our models. The correlation matrix 
had a pattern similar to that shown in Model 4. Pre-disaster home value had a significant 
  
93 
negative correlation with disaster damage suggesting that higher valued homes 
experienced more absolute home value loss. On the other hand, pre-disaster home value 
had significant positive correlations with home restoration and the long term recovery, 
suggesting that higher valued homes had faster home restoration and recovery. The 
negative correlation between home restoration and the long term recovery rate at the 
household level – that is, for homes in the same neighborhood – suggested that homes 
within a particular neighborhood became less variable in the long run in spite of some 
short-term variation. On the other hand, the positive correlation between these two 
variables at the neighborhood level suggested that neighborhoods that led the way in the 
restoration period also recovery faster in the long term recovery period. Clearly, homes 
in different neighborhoods became more variable in the long run.    
Summary 
The overall single family housing recovery took two years to finish in south 
Miami-Dade County following Hurricane Andrew. The average home value, 
experiencing a 50.3% loss because of the hurricane damage, returned to its pre-disaster 
level in 1994. However, the average recovery process did not apply to each individual 
household. Two years after Hurricane Andrew (1994), 33% of households had not 
reached their pre-event housing status. Four years after (1996), 16% of households were 
still below their pre-event home values. 
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Table 5.13. Residual Variances and Correlations Matrix of Model 5 
 
Household Level 
 Correlations 
 
Variance Initial Value 
Housing 
Damage 
Housing 
Restoration 
Initial housing value (1992) 551.16***    
Housing damage (1992-1993) 369.91*** -0.36***   
Housing value increase per year in the restoration period  (1993-1994) 494.28*** 0.33*** -0.83***  
Housing value increase per year in long-term recovery period (1994-1996)  38.40*** 0.34*** -0.38*** -0.03*** 
 
Neighborhood Level   
 Correlations   
 
Variance Initial Value 
Housing 
Damage 
Housing 
Restoration 
Total 
Variance R Square 
Initial housing value (1992) 788.05***    2963.53 0.55****** 
Housing damage (1992-1993) 369.61*** -0.52***   1081.72 0.32****** 
Housing value increase per year in the restoration period  (1993-1994) 274.78*** 0.44*** -0.94***  1023.63 0.25****** 
Housing value increase per year in long-term recovery period (1994-1996)  19.89*** 0.48*** -0.41*** 0.25*** 68.13 0.14****** 
 
Note: R square is the fraction by which total variance has decreased from model 1. This is the proportion of variance that can be explained by 
independent variables in model 5.   
   *
 p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01 (two-tailed test) 
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The Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM) revealed the pattern of variations in 
housing recovery across households and neighborhoods. Owner occupied housing 
recovered faster than rental units in the early recovery period (1992-1994). Rental units 
began to pick up as the recovery process went along (1994-1996). Post disaster home 
sales, especially those occurred immediately following the event, significantly slowed 
housing recovery process. Neighborhood income level had a significant positive effect 
on housing recovery throughout the period. Neighborhood race/ethnicity composition 
had effect on recovery process. Homes in predominantly Hispanic neighborhood 
restored slower than those in predominantly White neighborhoods in the early recovery 
period (1992-1994). But they began to pick up as the recovery process went along 
(1994-1996). Neighborhood Black composition had significant negative effect on 
housing recovery throughout the whole period. When examining Cuban-Hispanics and 
non-Cuban Hispanics separately, Cubans did show a different effect on housing recovery 
from non-Cubans. Although neighborhood Cuban composition had a negative effect on 
housing recovery in the early period following the event (1992-1994), the negative effect 
quickly disappeared and became positive between 1994 and 1996. On the other hand, 
neighborhood non-Cuban composition had a negative effect on housing recovery 
through out the whole post-disaster period. Although not explicitly hypothesized, our 
data analysis also suggested that hurricane damage reduced housing inequality in the 
impact area right after the event. However, the pre-disaster pattern was reproduced in the 
recovery period. In fact, housing inequality across households and neighborhoods even 
went up to a higher level during the recovery process. In addition, housing inequality 
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among the severely damaged area (Hurricane Eye), moderately damaged area (Eye Wall) 
and the slightly damaged area (Adjacent Edge) increased in the recovery period with 
homes in the heavily impact area falling further behind.              
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CHAPTER VI  
DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Discussions 
This research addresses a critical gap in disaster recovery literature by 
systematically examining housing recovery processes following a major natural disaster. 
With a longitudinal dataset, descriptive statistics, intercorrelations, and the hierarchical 
linear modeling (HLM) were applied to answer two research questions: (1) what is the 
housing recovery process after Hurricane Andrew in Miami-Dade County, and (2) how 
does housing recovery vary across households and neighborhoods?  Regarding the first 
question, our findings suggest that Hurricane Andrew caused extensive housing damage 
in the impact area, rendering an average of 50.4% loss of pre-disaster home values. Two 
years after the storm (1994), the average home value returned to its pre-disaster level. In 
the subsequent two years –1995 and 1996-- the average home value continued growing, 
representing a 7.6% and 14.9% gain, respectively, over the pre-disaster averages. This 
“average” recovery process, however, was clearly not representative of all affected 
households. Two years after the disaster (1994), 32% of 56,288 households (18,013) had 
not reached their pre-disaster levels. Three years later (1995), the percentage of un-
recovered households had dropped to 21% and four years later (1996), it had dropped to 
16%.   
These analyses reveal that the recovery process varied significantly from one 
household to another. Our analysis also indicates that housing recovery varied 
significantly across neighborhoods with some areas leading and others falling behind. 
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Although Hurricane Andrew’s extensive damage initially reduced pre-disaster housing 
inequality in south Miami-Dade County, this inequality resumed during the recovery 
period, and returned to a higher level four years after the storm. Previous studies 
suggested that the community impact of natural disasters disappears within a decade 
(Friesma et al., 1979; Wright et al., 1979). Our results showed that the impact of 
hurricane damage on housing recovery lasted at least more than four years. 
With regard to the second research question, our analysis found that household 
characteristics and neighborhood characteristics are important factors in determining the 
recovery process. Hypothesis 1 is supported. Owner-occupied single family housing did 
show more rapid recovery than rental units, especially in the early recovery period 
(before 1994). This is consistent with the observations of previous research which 
concluded that rental properties often take significantly longer to rebuild (Bolin, 1986, 
1993; Comerio et al., 1994).  
Hypothesis 2 is supported by finding that home sales were very active after 
Hurricane Andrew in Miami-Dade County. Home sales, especially those occurring in the 
years immediately following the disaster, significantly slowed the housing recovery 
process. One plausible explanation is that Hurricane Andrew reinforced the ongoing out-
migration of Anglos in south Miami-Dade County as suggested by Morrow and Peacock 
(1997). The positive correlations between number of home sales and the percentage of 
White population in a neighborhood are consistent with this hypothetical explanation. 
With such an intensive disaster, some home owners may have just sold their damaged 
houses, taken their insurance settlements and immigrated to other areas they may have 
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been contemplating before the disaster. In addition, we cannot rule out the possibility 
that some property owners were forced to sell their homes because they did not have the 
ability to repair the damaged homes. The strong negative correlations between number 
of home sales and home ownership provide evidence for this argument. Research by 
Bolin (1986, 1993) and Comerio et al. (1994) documented that landlords of rental units 
often did not have sufficient resources and incentives to repair damaged rental properties.     
Hypothesis 3 is supported. Our findings suggest neighborhood racial/ethnic 
composition matters during the housing recovery process. Considering all Hispanics as a 
group, the concentration of minorities in a neighborhood (both Blacks and Hispanics), 
had a significant negative effect on housing recovery. In addition, this negative effect 
was especially strong in the early recovery period (before 1994). Clearly, homes located 
in neighborhoods with a high minority representation recovered at a much slower rate 
than areas with a high level of White concentration.   
Hypothesis 4 is also supported. Neighborhood median household income had a 
positive effect on housing recovery. Homes in higher income neighborhoods not only led 
the way in the restoration period, their advantages were further strengthened in the long 
term recovery period. As a result, housing inequality between neighborhoods at different 
income levels increased during the recovery period. This finding is consistent with 
previous research on household recovery which suggested that income is an important 
determinant of household recovery (Bolin, 1986, 1993; Bolin & Bolton, 1983; Bolin & 
Stanford, 1991, 1997; Phillips, 1993).  
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The evidence for Hypothesis 5 is mixed. When considering Cubans and non-
Cubans as two separate groups, the neighborhoods with a high a percentage of Cubans 
experienced a negative effect on housing recovery in the early recovery period (prior to 
1994). This is somewhat surprising given previous research that suggested the 
advantages of Cubans over non-Cuban Hispanics and Blacks (Peacock & Girard, 1997). 
However, this negative effect of neighborhood Cubans composition quickly disappeared 
as the recovery went along. Ultimately, it had a significantly positive effect on housing 
recovery in the long-term recovery period.  
Hypothesis 6 is supported. Neighborhoods with a high percentage of non-Hispanic 
Blacks experienced negative effects on housing recovery throughout the whole period. 
Homes in neighborhoods with high concentrations of non-Hispanic Blacks lagged 
further behind as the recovery went along. Consequently, housing inequality between 
Blacks populated areas and other neighborhoods was exacerbated in the period following 
the disaster. Hypothesis 7 is partially supported. While the concentration of non-Cuban 
Hispanics had a significant negative effect on housing recovery in the early recovery 
period, it showed no difference from the effect of the neighborhood White concentration 
in the long-term recovery period.  
Limitations and Future Research 
Every research has its limitations. This study is no exception. First, we did not 
have data on housing reconstruction financing. The amount of insurance settlements, 
governmental reconstruction loans or grants that an affected household received is an 
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important factor determining housing recovery progress. However, previous studies 
suggested that owner occupancy (Bolin, 1986, 1993; Comerio et al., 1994), income level 
(Bolin, 1986; Bolin & Bolton, 1983; Tierney, 1997), and household race/ethnicity 
(Peacock & Girard, 1997) are significantly correlated with the ability to acquire 
sufficient repair/reconstruction financing to repair damage. Taking these findings into 
account, our conclusions about homeownership, income, and race/ethnicity are likely 
robust when considering the lack of data on reconstruction financing.   
Second, the direct measurement of individual household characteristics such as 
income, race/ethnicity, education, and occupation is needed to fully discern each 
variable’s effect on housing recovery. Although our findings about the effect of 
neighborhood racial/ethnic composition on housing recovery may reflect the aggregated 
effect of race/ethnicity of each individual household within a neighborhood, one should 
be cautious when applying these results to any particular household. 
Third, more data needs to be gathered to separate the effects of independent 
variables due to the disaster impact from those that would have taken place if there had 
not been a disaster. One may argue that housing values had been appreciating between 
1992 and 1996 in Miami-Dade County. According to the Consumer Price Indexes (CPI) 
published by the Department of Labor, the average annual appreciation of housing 
values was 4.5% in Miami-Dade County during this period2. This means that the real 
housing recovery – reflected through housing values – following Hurricane Andrew was 
actually slower than that shown by the tax appraisal. CPI, however, does not threaten our 
                                                 
2
 The CPI index is for the Miami-Fort Lauderdale area in Florida, which covers Miami-Dade County. Data 
was retrieved from the Department of Labor website: http://www.bls.gov/cpi/homt.htm on Jan. 10th 2006.  
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findings because all home values in our dataset will simply change by a constant 
proportion when being adjusted by CPI. The differences in the housing recovery process 
across households and neighborhoods still remain the same.  
Others may draw conclusions from previous studies which showed that 
neighborhood minority composition, especially Black representation, exerts a 
significantly negative effect on housing value appreciation (Conley, 1999; Flippen, 2004; 
Massey & Denton, 1995; Oliver & Shapiro, 1995). Thus, the findings on race/ethnicity 
effects may simply reflect the prevailing differences in housing value appreciation. 
However, a series of studies found that property values of low-income households and 
minority households are systematically over-assessed in the United States (Black, 1977; 
Brich et al., 1990, 1992; Birch et al., 2004; Engle, 1975; Ihlanfeldt, 1982). Thus, the real 
difference in home values across households and neighborhoods should have been 
bigger than that shown in our analysis. Clearly, more data is needed to separate the 
recovery process from the “normal” process. A dataset with multiple time points before 
the disaster or a quasi-experimental design could fulfill this purpose.     
Fourth, although single family dwellings constitute the major proportion of the 
housing stock in Miami-Dade County (54 %), multi-family housing (46%), is a very 
important element in housing recovery as well. This type of housing actually includes a 
number of variations such as duplex, multi-family housing with three or more units, 
cluster homes, condominiums, and townhouses. Comerio (1998) and Wu and Lindell 
(2004) suggested that the recovery problem for multi-family housings is very different 
from single family because of the complexity of property ownership: a combination of 
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individual ownership of each dwelling unit and group ownership of the common space. 
Thus, more empirical research on this topic is also needed.  
Finally, in-depth research on post-disaster home sales is needed to fully understand 
how housing transactions affect recovery. Clearly, research on post-disaster home sales 
represents a gap in the literature. The following questions should be addressed in future 
research: (1) who is selling? (2) who is buying? (3) what are the reasons for buying 
and/or selling? (4) how do these factors correlate with housing repair/reconstruction of 
the properties in the transaction?  
Theoretical Contribution and Practical Implications 
Notwithstanding the limitations, this study has theoretical contributions to social 
vulnerability literature. There has been a general consensus in the literature on the major 
socioeconomic and sociodemographic variables that influence social vulnerability to 
disasters (Blaikie et al., 1994; Cutter et al., 2003). The most widely accepted variables 
include age, gender, race/ethnicity, and income. However, there has been little research 
attempting to measure how the social vulnerability realizes itself in the housing recovery 
process. This research addresses this critical gap by revealing the significant variations 
of housing recovery across households and neighborhoods. Rental properties, homes in 
minority neighborhoods experienced slower housing recovery.  
In addition, this study improves the current state of knowledge about disaster 
impact. Although previous research concluded that the residual impact of disasters on 
housing over a decade is minimal at the community level (Friesma et al., 1979; Wright et 
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al., 1979), it did not attempt to document at which point the disaster impact disappears. 
Our data suggest that the housing impact was still significant four years after Hurricane 
Andrew when a considerable proportion of households (16%) had not reached their pre-
disaster housing status. In addition, the housing recovery process varied considerably 
across households and neighborhoods with some leading the way and others falling 
behind. Indeed, housing inequality in the impact area increased during the recovery 
process.   
This research also has important practical implications. Our findings suggest that 
market-based housing recovery fails to achieve a balanced housing recovery. Rental 
properties and homes in predominantly minority neighborhoods, especially areas with a 
high percentage of Black, were left behind during the reconstruction process. 
Government should improve its role in assisting private housing recovery. This is not 
suggesting that government should expand its already very expensive recovery bill 
(Mileti, 1999; Cemerio, 1998), but rather make current programs more effective. Recent 
major disasters have repeatedly taught us that government aid for housing reconstruction 
is not particularly effective in reaching low income, minority victims (Bolin, 1986; 
Comerio, 1998; Kamel & Loukaitou-Sideris, 2004). Current recovery assistance 
programs (i.e., FEMA’s MHR and IFG, SBA loan) should consider the special needs 
victims may have when accessing these programs. For example, low income and 
minority people often have limited mobility, language barriers, and limited ability to 
navigate the application process. These special needs should be taken into consideration 
when administrating recovery assistance programs following a major disaster.  
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In addition, government housing recovery programs should have a collaboration 
strategy to avoid any duplication or confusion that can create considerable time delays 
for victims, especially low-income and minority populations. Comerio (1998), for 
example, documented that victims of Loma Prieta Earthquake had to work with FEMA 
and SBA separately in order to become eligible for grants or loans. As a result, many 
applicants had to have their damaged properties inspected many times by various 
agencies. Moreover, the slow recovery of rental properties and frequent turnover of such 
units following Hurricane Andrew call for government recovery programs specially 
designed for this portion of housing stock. Current federal programs, both FEMA’s 
IFG/MHR and SBA loan are mainly targeted to homeowners (Comerio, 1998).       
Local governments should incorporate housing recovery into their disaster 
recovery agenda. Particularly, housing recovery for those socially vulnerable groups and 
areas should be prioritized in local policies. First of all, local governments should keep 
updated information on 1) characteristics of the hazards and the areas likely to be 
affected; 2) population characteristics, composition and distribution; and 3) existing 
building stock location and characteristics. Based on this information, local governments 
should pinpoint the groups and areas that are likely to have the most difficulty in 
achieving housing recovery. Second, local governments should maintain communication 
with external recovery programs in order to direct the reconstruction resources to the 
most needy victims and areas following a disaster. Pre-event housing reconstruction 
planning should be practiced to achieve these purposes. However, in addition to 
emphasizing fast post-disaster administrative decision making for housing reconstruction 
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(Comerio, 1998; Schwab et al., 1998; Wu & Lindell, 2004), the planning process should 
also focuses on 1) identifying households with the most obstacles to overcoming for 
housing recovery, and 2) connecting these households with potential external recovery 
resources.   
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APPENDIX 
Model Specifications for Model 1 through Model 5  
 
Model 1: Total Variation in Housing Trajectories  
Level I: Housing damage, restoration and long term recovery 
thnhnhnhnhnthn eRECOVERYLTNRESTORATIODISASTERV ++++= _3210 αααα  
Here: 
hn0α  Initial value of housing 1992 
hn1α  Housing damage 
hn2α  Housing restoration rate 
hn3α  Long term housing recovery rate 
thne  Error item; it is assumed to be independent and normally distributed with a mean of 
0 and constant variance σ2. 
 
Level II: Household Level Variation 
hhn a0000 += βα  
hhn a1101 += βα  
hhn a2202 += βα  
hhn a3303 += βα  
 
Level III: Neighborhood Level Variation 
nb00000 += γβ  
nb11010 += γβ  
nb22020 += γβ  
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nb33030 += γβ  
Model 2: The Effects of Household Characteristics 
Level I: Housing damage, restoration and long term recovery 
thnhnhnhnhnthn eRECOVERYLTNRESTORATIODISASTERV ++++= _3210 αααα  
 
Level II: Household Level Variation 
h
hnhnhnhnhn
a
OWNERSHIPBATHBEDROOMAGEHOME
0
04030201000 _
+
++++= βββββα
 
hhnhn
hnhnhnhnhn
aEDGEEYEWALL
OWNERSHIPBATHBEDROOMAGEHOME
11615
14131211101 _
+++
++++=
ββ
βββββα
 
hhnhn
hnhnhnhnhn
aEDGEEYEWALL
OWNERSHIPBATHBEDROOMAGEHOME
22625
24232221202 _
+++
++++=
ββ
βββββα
 
hhnhn
hnhnhnhnhn
aEDGEEYEWALL
OWNERSHIPBATHBEDROOMAGEHOME
33635
34333231303 _
+++
++++=
ββ
βββββα
 
Level III: Neighborhood Level Variation 
nb00000 += γβ  
nb11010 += γβ  
nb22020 += γβ  
nb33030 += γβ  
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Model 3: The Effects of Post-disaster Home Sales  
Level I: Housing damage, restoration and long term recovery 
thnhnhnhnhnthn eRECOVERYLTNRESTORATIODISASTERV ++++= _3210 αααα  
 
Level II model: Household Level Variation 
h
hnhnhnhnhn
a
OWNERSHIPBATHBEDROOMAGEHOME
0
04030201000 _
+
++++= βββββα
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+++
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9496
_
++++
++++=
βββ
βββββα
 
Level III model Neighborhood Level Variation 
nb00000 += γβ  
nb11010 += γβ  
nb22020 += γβ  
nb33030 += γβ  
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Model 4: The Effects of Neighborhood Level Variables  
Level I: Housing damage, restoration and long term recovery 
thnhnhnhnhnthn eRECOVERYLTNRESTORATIODISASTERV ++++= _3210 αααα  
 
Level II: Household Level Variation 
h
hnhnhnhnhn
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0
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_
++++
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Level III: Neighborhood Level Variation 
nnnn bBLACKPERHISPPERINCOMEMED 00302010000 ___ ++++= γγγγβ  
nnnn bBLACKPERHISPPERINCOMEMED 11312111010 ___ ++++= γγγγβ  
nnnn bBLACKPERHISPPERINCOMEMED 22322212020 ___ ++++= γγγγβ  
nnnn bBLACKPERHISPPERINCOMEMED 33332313030 ___ ++++= γγγγβ  
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Model 5: Cuban-Hispanics vs. Non-Cuban Hispanics  
Level I: Housing damage, restoration and long term recovery 
thnhnhnhnhnthn eRECOVERYLTNRESTORATIODISASTERV ++++= _3210 αααα  
 
Level II: Household Level Variation 
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Level III: Neighborhood Level Variation 
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